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In Employment Division v. Smith,1 the United States Supreme Court
severely limited the scope of the free exercise clause of the first
amendment to the United States Constitution. 2 The Court held that
the first amendment does not protect individuals from neutral laws
that incidentally inhibit, or even preclude, the practice of their reli-
gion.3 Prior to the Smith decision, the Supreme Court applied a
strict scrutiny test to review neutral laws that inhibited the free exer-
cise of religion.4 The strict scrutiny test requires a government to
1. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
2. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1603 (1990) (limiting to narrow set of
circumstances applicability of Court's traditional use of strict scrutiny test to evaluate laws
burdening religious practice); see also infra notes 212-22 and accompanying text (analyzing
Court's departure from precedent).
The first amendment to the Constitution provides in part that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CowsT.
amend. I (emphasis added). The free exercise clause is applicable to the states by incorpora-
tion into the fourteenth amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)
(holding statute prohibiting dissemination of religious literature to be violative of fourteenth
amendment, which embraces liberties guaranteed by first amendment).
3. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1599-1602.
4. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1987)
(applying strict scrutiny test to strike down denial of unemployment benefits to Seventh-day
Adventist fired for refusing to work on Sabbath Day); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (finding that state interest in eradicating racial discrimination in educa-
tion satisfies strict scrutiny); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-59 (1982) (finding public
interest in maintaining tax system sufficiently compelling to override religious claim that pay-
ment of social security taxes offends religious belief); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,
718-20 (1981) (applying strict scrutiny test to strike down denial of unemployment benefits
for Jehovah's Witness whose religious beliefs prevented him from manufacturing war weap-
ons); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-29 (1972) (finding unconstitutional, as applied to
Amish, mandatory school attendance law that conflicts with religious practices and beliefs
despite compelling state interest in compulsory education); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437, 461-62 (1971) (finding incidental burden on religion "justified by substantial govern-
ment interests" relating to military conscription); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09
(1963) (finding no compelling state interest enforced in eligibility provisions of unemploy-
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demonstrate that a challenged law or practice serves a compelling
state interest and that the means chosen to achieve that interest are
narrowly tailored. 5 Smith confined the application of the strict scru-
tiny test and held that this standard of review is inappropriate when
state action incidentally or unintentionally burdens a religious prac-
tice.6 Accordingly, the Court refused to exempt the Native Ameri-
can respondents, dismissed from their jobs for participating in a
religious ritual involving the ingestion of peyote, from Oregon's law
prohibiting peyote use.7 In doing so, the Supreme Court effectively
limited first amendment strict scrutiny to situations in which the
government singles out a particular religion and intentionally limits
the rights of its members.8
In its decision to abrogate the compelling state interest test, the
Supreme Court changed the meaning of the free exercise clause.
Prior to Smith, state governments were required to respond to their
constituents' free exercise rights.9 When a government passed a law
that adversely affected a person's religious liberty, the courts strictly
ment compensation law that justified infringement of right to religious freedom); see also infra
notes 37-87 and accompanying text (discussing cases applying strict scrutiny test to free exer-
cise claims). But see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447-
53 (1988) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny test to Native American Indian challenge to plan to
build federal road through Native American religious site, because first amendment only pro-
tects coercion or prohibition of religious beliefs or practices, but not laws that only make
practice of religion difficult); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1986) (refusing to apply
strict scrutiny test in case involving Native American claim that assigning daughter social se-
curity number would violate religious beliefs, because first amendment does not require gov-
ernment to conduct internal affairs in ways that comport with religious beliefs); see also infra
notes 88-120 and accompanying text (discussing cases not applying strict scrutiny test be-
cause prohibition of religious beliefs was not involved).
5. See Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141-42 (affirming that conditioning receipt of benefit on con-
duct proscribed by religious beliefs infringes upon free exercise and could be justified only by
proof of compelling state interest); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718 (stating that inroad on religious
liberty may be justified by showing that it is least restrictive means of achieving some compel-
ling state interest); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 (noting that for state to compel school attendance
against claim that such requirement interferes with legitimate religious beliefs, state's interest
must be of "sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free
Exercise Clause"); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (requiring compelling state interest to justify sub-
stantial infringement of first amendment right and noting insufficiency of showing "rational
relationship to some colorable state interest").
6. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602-06 (1990) (evaluating prece-
dent and distinguishing Smith).
7. Id. at 1606; see also infra note 127 (explaining peyote ritual).
8. See infra notes 200-50 and accompanying text (criticizing Supreme Court for depart-
ing from established free exercise precedent in Smith decision).
9. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987) (find-
ing that state may not require employee to choose between precepts of religion and forfeiting
benefits); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981) (providing that state may not
condition receipt of benefits upon conduct proscribed by religious beliefs or deny such bene-
fit because of conduct mandated by religious beliefs); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220
(1972) (positing that regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, offend the require-
ment for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens free exercise of religion).
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scrutinized the law under the first amendment.' 0 Pursuant to the
ruling in Smith, however, if a government passes a neutral law, the
law is immune from constitutional challenge, notwithstanding the
law's possible devastating effects on the free exercise of religion."
The Smith decision contradicts well-established free exercise prece-
dent and offends this nation's commitment to protect religious lib-
erty as expressed in the first amendment of the Constitution.
Part I of this Note traces the evolution of the Supreme Court's
treatment of the free exercise clause and discusses the emergence of
the compelling state interest test for the adjudication of free exer-
cise claims. Part II presents the majority, concurring, and dissent-
ing opinions in Employment Division v. Smith. Part III criticizes the
Court's decision as an unjustified departure from established free
exercise precedent. In Smith, the Court mischaracterized the mean-
ing of free exercise precedent, and, by eliminating the compelling
state interest test, abandoned its assigned role as the protector of
constitutional rights. Part IV addresses the implications of the Smith
decision on future free exercise claims, and argues that members of
minority religions are now without a remedy when a neutral law
makes the practice of their religion impossible. This Note con-
cludes that abandoning strict scrutiny of free exercise claims elimi-
nates a significant safeguard of religious liberty. The removal of the
state's burden to satisfy strict scrutiny will have the highly undesir-
able effect of generating legislative indifference toward religious
beliefs.
I. BACKGROUND
Virtually all free exercise cases involve a struggle between an indi-
vidual's religious conscience and the government's need to promul-
gate uniformly applicable laws. 12 The right to exercise religious
beliefs freely is deeply ingrained in United States history.' 3 The
10. See infra notes 37-87 and accompanying text (discussing application of strict scrutiny
test to free exercise cases).
11. See infra notes 264-74 and accompanying text (discussing potential implications of
Court's decision in Smith).
12. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1608 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (stating that all free exercise cases before Supreme Court concerned generally applica-
ble laws having effect of significantly burdening religious practices); see also infra notes 21-125
and accompanying text (discussing Court's past treatment of free exercise claims).
13. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (stating that values underlying free
exercise clause have been "zealously protected" throughout United States' history).
The Supreme Court has distinguished between the exercise of religion or religious "con-
duct" and religious "belief." See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-03 (noting that although free exer-
cise clause bars governmental regulation of religious beliefs, Supreme Court has rejected free
exercise challenges to governmental regulation of overt acts prompted by those religious be-
liefs or principles); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-04 (1961) (explaining that right to
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government's need to make law is equally essential to our society.
When individual rights clash with the law, courts resolve the conflict
by deciding whether to accommodate religious rights, thereby al-
lowing individual religious beliefs to constrain governmental prac-
tices, or to defer to the government, thereby allowing government
to inhibit, or in some cases eliminate, the religious practice.
Supreme Court free exercise jurisprudence falls into three histori-
cal periods. First, between 1879 and approximately 1950, the Court
consistently denied free exercise challenges to generally applicable,
neutral laws that burdened religious conduct. 14 During this era, the
believe is absolute, but freedom to act is not entirely free from governmental restriction).
Laws proscribing particular religious beliefs are categorically unconstitutional. See id. at 402
(indicating that free exercise clause firmly prohibits government from regulating religious
beliefs); see also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (holding that government may
not compel affirmation of any religious belief); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69-70
(1953) (holding government may not penalize individuals or groups possessing religious
views abhorrent to majority); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577-78 (1944)
(holding that government may not tax dissemination of religious beliefs); Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-10 (1943) (invalidating tax inhibiting dissemination of religious
views).
Religious conduct, however, is subject to regulation if the motive of the legislation is not
discriminatorily directed at religion. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940)
(striking down state statute forbidding persons to solicit money for religious cause and noting
that freedom to believe is absolute, while freedom of religious conduct remains subject to
regulation for protection of society); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-66 (1879)
(upholding law proscribing polygamy and finding that Congress has power to restrict actions
which violate social duties or are contrary to social order).
Defining the permissible scope of regulation is the central issue in all fi'ee exercise cases
involving religious conduct. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-09 (balancing burdens of regulation
on free exercise of religion with state's interest in regulation). The principle that religious
interests are not automatically subordinate to legitimate state interests, but rather the two
must be balanced, is widely accepted. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 (concluding that only inter-
ests of highest order can outweigh legitimate claims to free exercise of religion); Cantwell, 310
U.S. at 304 (stating that regulation of religious conduct must be exercised so as not to unduly
infringe upon protected freedom). But see Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603 (ruling that neutral, gener-
ally applicable laws that incidentally burden free exercise of religion should not be subjected
to strict scrutiny requiring compelling state interest).
14. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946) (upholding conviction of
Mormon polygamist under federal statute prohibiting interstate transportation of women for
immoral purposes); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167-71 (1944) (holding that
mother could be prosecuted under child labor law for using her children to distribute reli-
gious literature); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934) (uphold-
ing public university suspension of students refusing to participate in ROTC because of
religious opposition to war); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342-45, 348 (1890) (upholding
law that made ability to vote contingent upon pledging that one is not member of organiza-
tion practicing polygamy); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-66 (1879) (upholding
criminal proscription of polygamy against free exercise challenge by Mormons); see also Braun-
feld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-07 (1961) (providing more recent example, where Court
upheld Sunday closing law against challenge by Jewish merchants that law burdened free ex-
ercise of their religion by causing economic disadvantages if they continued to observe Sab-
bath on Saturday).
After the American Revolution the states attempted to resolve the conflict between reli-
gious freedom and generally applicable secular laws by granting religious exemptions to laws
inhibiting free exercise. See McConnell, The Onrins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410, 1511-13 (1990) (concluding that interpretation of free exer-
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Court reasoned that while the free exercise clause of the first
amendment prohibited the regulation of and discrimination against
religious beliefs, it did not protect religious practices. 15 Second,
during the era of the Warren Court1 6 and in the early years of the
Burger Court,17 the Supreme Court required legislatures to exempt
certain religious practices from generally applicable laws in the ab-
sence of a compelling state interest that justified the burden on free
exercise.18 Third, beginning in the 1980s, the Court became less
willing to sustain free exercise challenges to neutral laws.19
Although the Supreme Court did not repudiate the compelling state
interest test, it often found the purported governmental interest
compelling, thereby allowing regulations to incidentally burden reli-
gious practices. 20
A. Early Free Exercise History
The Supreme Court decided the first free exercise case, Reynolds v.
United States, in 1879.21 In Reynolds, the Court upheld an anti-polyg-
amy law as it applied to members of the Mormon Church.22
Mormons believed that God commanded male members of the
church to practice polygamy.23 The Court reasoned that although
the protective scope of the free exercise clause extended to the free-
dom of an individual to hold religious beliefs, Congress possessed
cise clause as mandating religious exemptions should have been familiar to framers and ra-
tifiers of Constitution).
15. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (noting that Congress may not exert legislative power
over opinion but may control practices violating social duties or subversive of good order).
16. Earl Warren was ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court from 1953 to 1969.
17. Warren Burger was ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court from 1969 to 1986.
18. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny test to
overturn state law which impeded religiou's practice); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403
(1963) (establishing strict scrutiny test for free exercise challenges); see also infra notes 37-76
and accompanying text (discussing Sherbert and progeny).
19. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447-53 (1988)
(upholding government plan to build road through Native American sacred religious site);
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1986) (holding that free exercise clause does not com-
pel government to exempt claimant from requirement that offends his religious beliefs).
20. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-04 (1983) (finding that
state's interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education substantially outweighed bur-
den that denial of tax benefits placed on exercise of religious beliefs); United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252, 257-59 (1982) (finding public interest in maintaining tax system sufficiently
compelling to override religious claim that payment of social security taxes offended religious
beliel).
21. 98 U.S. 145 (1879). See generally Comment, First Americans and the First Amendment:
American Indians Battle for Religious Freedom, 13 S. ILL. U.LJ. 945, 947-48 (1989) (providing
overview of Reynolds decision).
22. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162-68 (1879).
23. Id. at 161. The Mormons believed the penalty for failing or refusing to practice po-
lygamy by male members of the church would be damnation in hell. Id.
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the legislative power to regulate religious practices.2 4 To permit an
individual to act in contravention of the law because of a religious
belief would be tantamount to making the law subordinate to reli-
gious beliefs. This would, in effect, permit all citizens to decide for
themselves whether or not to obey the law.25 The Court found that
the practice of polygamy was an offense against society. 26 Accord-
ingly, it refused to grant the Mormons a religious exemption from
anti-polygamy laws. 27
Sixty-one years later, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,28 the
Supreme Court once again subordinated religious beliefs and prac-
tices to majoritarian sentiments. The Court upheld a school board's
24. Id. at 162-64 (discussing guarantees of religious freedom); see also supra note 13 (dis-
cussing belief/conduct distinction in free exercise doctrine).
The belief/conduct distinction is highly problematic. Belief and conduct are so closely in-
tertwined that refusing to protect religious conduct from state regulation will often render the
right to believe in religion meaningless. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1973)
(stating "belief and action cannot [always] be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments").
See generally Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion: A Sociological Approach, 67 MicH. L. REV. 679,
681-84 (1969) (discussing questionable results reached in free exercise cases employing be-
lief/conduct distinction as rule of decision). Justice Brennan quoted Oliver Cromwell to illus-
trate the problem with the belief/conduct distinction: "As to freedom of conscience, I
meddle with no man's conscience; but if you mean by that, liberty to celebrate the Mass, I
would have you understand that in no place where the power of the Parliament of England
prevails shall that be permitted." McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 631 n.2 (1978) (Brennan,J.,
concurring), quoted in S. HOOK, PARADOXES OF FREEDOM 23 (1962); see also Comment, Free Exer-
cise in the 1980s: A Rollback of Protection, 24 U.S.F. L. REv. 505, 507-08 & n.20 (1990) (discuss-
ing problematic nature of belief/conduct distinction).
25. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67.
26. Id. at 164-65 (noting practice was contrary to northern and western European prac-
tice); see also Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1890) (noting opinion that polygamy, the distinguishing feature of Mor-
mon faith, is abhorrent to civilized world and repugnant to our laws); Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (stating that first amendment not intended to protect against legislation
punishing acts against society). As reflected in Beason, Late Corp., and Reynolds, the desire to
eradicate the Mormon Church was widespread. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, § 14-13, at 1271 (2d ed. 1988) (providing brief background of what effectively
amounted to religious persecution of Mormons).
The refusal of the Court in Reynolds to protect Mormons because of the offensiveness of
their religion seems archaic when juxtaposed against the mainstream free exercise jurispru-
dence of the last quarter century, which forged protections of individual rights against the
"tyranny of the majority." See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403, 406. In the last decade, however, the
Supreme Court has hinted that in the future individual free exercise rights will be
subordinated to majoritarian rule without requiring that any compelling state interest be
served. See infra notes 78-125 and accompanying text (discussing Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), and
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) and evaluating decline in free exercise protection).
Before the rulings of the 1980s, the Reynolds decision may have been more appropriately
relegated to a mere footnote discussing the earlier, more primitive treatment of free exercise
claims. Because the Court has seemingly come full circle and returned to this primitive nine-
teenth-century approach to individual rights, an understanding of the Supreme Court's analy-
sis in Reynolds is important to an evaluation of the Court's decision in Employment Division v.
Smith.
27. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879).
28. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943).
1991] EMPLOYMENT DIVISION v SMITH 1437
expulsion of young Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to salute the
flag in school because they believed that saluting the flag would vio-
late the written law of God. 29 The Court determined that the legis-
lative decision of the school board did not violate the free exercise
clause because it was not discriminatorily directed toward the stu-
dents' religious beliefs.30 It reasoned that religious convictions
could not excuse a person from obeying a neutral law aimed at pro-
moting national unity.31 Three years later, however, the Supreme
Court overruled Minersville in West Virginia Board of Education v. Bar-
nette.32 In doing so, the Court elevated the Bill of Rights above the
majoritarian concerns that prevailed in Reynolds and Minersville.
Barnette, like Minersville, involved a Jehovah's Witness' free exer-
cise challenge to a mandatory flag salute statute.33 Brought solely
on religious grounds, but decided on free speech grounds, Barnette
upheld a student's right to refuse to salute the flag in a public
school.34 The Court's commitment in Barnette to protect intellectual
and spiritual freedom is meaningful in the free exercise context as
well as in free speech doctrine.35 The decision represented an in-
creased willingness on the part of the Court to accommodate reli-
gious liberty.36 This toleration for spiritual diversity is the
29. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591-92 (1940), overruled in West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
30. See id. at 594-96 (arguing that free exercise clause has never precluded legislation not
directed at doctrinal loyalties of particular sect).
31. Id. To justify this conclusion, the Court stated that:
[c]onscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious
toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious con-
victions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve
the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities.
Id. at 595-96.
32. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
33. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 625-30 (1943) (pro-
viding background of free exercise challenge). For a detailed discussion of these compulsory
flag salute cases, see McAninch, A Catalyst for the Evolution of Constitutional Law: Jehovah's Wit-
nesses in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 997, 1015-25 (1987).
34. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. The Court in Barnette considered whether a ceremony in-
volving matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed on an individual by govern-
mental authority. Id. at 635-36.
35. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641. In a passage widely quoted for its eloquent statement of
the preeminent stature of individual rights in America, the Court stated:
[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a
mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things
that touch the heart of the existing order.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.
Id. at 642.
36. See id. at 636 (noting purpose of Bill of Rights was to withdraw fundamental rights
from political controversy and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by courts).
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ideological foundation upon which the Court based subsequent de-
cisions that constructed constitutional safeguards for religious
liberty.
B. Sherbert v. Verner-The Court Establishes the Strict Scrutiny Test
Eighty-five years after Reynolds, the Warren Court faced a free ex-
ercise claim in Sherbert v. Verner.37 In Sherbert, the Supreme Court
held that neutral laws or government conduct burdening sincere
religious practices must be analyzed under a strict scrutiny test.38
The Court thereby established a mechanism for successful free exer-
cise challenges by requiring the government to be responsive to the
needs of members of religious groups, rather than merely requiring
neutrality.3 9
The strict scrutiny test, as applied in free exercise cases, requires
that plaintiffs seeking exemption from a government requirement
first show that their sincerely held religious beliefs conflict with, and
are thus burdened by, a law or government requirement.40 Once
37. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
38. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). The terms "strict scrutiny," "compel-
ling state interest test," "compelling state interest/least restrictive means test," and "Sherbert
test" are used synonymously throughout this Note to refer to the same constitutional test.
Jurists who favor a more narrow interpretation of the free exercise clause question the appro-
priateness of granting religious exemptions to laws not specifically directed at religion. See
McConnell, supra note 14, at 1418 (suggesting that free exercise clause exists only to prevent
government from singling out religious practice for peculiar disability); Bork, The Supreme
Court and the Religion Clauses, in "TURNING THE RELIGION CLAUSES ON THEIR HEADS": PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONFERENCE OF THE CATHOLIC LEAGUE FOR
RELIGIOUS AND CML RIGHTS 83, 84 (1988) (arguing that evils to be prevented are laws that
intentionally restrict religious observance). But see Comment, Free Exercise in the 1980s, supra
note 24, at 540 (arguing that Sherbert compelling state interest test should be expanded to
provide greater protection of religious liberty); McConnell, supra note 14, at 1415 (positing
that Sherbert's interpretation of free exercise clause is in accord with historical evidence and
was within contemplation of framers of Constitution as possible interpretation).
Laws designed to limit the rights of a particular religion, such as a law outlawing the wor-
ship of a particular religion's god, would not be enacted because they would clearly violate the
free exercise clause. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1608 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (stating "few states would be so naive as to enact a law directly prohibiting or
burdening religious practice as such"). Indeed, the vast majority of free exercise cases involve
generally applicable laws that do not clearly violate the first amendment. Id. Advocates of
strong first amendment protection of religious practices argue that the free exercise clause
protects these practices against even incidental or unintended effects of government action.
See McConnell, supra note 14, at 1418 (setting forth "exemption" view of free exercise clause).
Under this approach, the governmental policy may be left intact, but an exemption should be
granted when application of the policy burdens religious practice without adequate justifica-
tion. Id. Additionally, indifference to, or ignorance of non-mainstream religions should also
fall under strict constitutional scrutiny. See id. (stating that under this view, free exercise
clause must prevent against "majoritarian presuppositions, ignorance, and indifference").
39. See Comment, Free Exercise in the 1980s, supra note 24, at 513-17 (discussing evolution
of Sherbert balancing test).
40. See L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 14-12, at 1242-51 (explaining that free exercise claim-
ant must first show that state requirement burdens sincerely held religious belief). To receive
first amendment protection, the plaintiff must show that the claims are sincerely rooted in
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this burden is met by a plaintiff, the burden shifts to the state. The
state prevails only if it demonstrates that there is a compelling inter-
est in the requirement, and that the least restrictive means to
achieve that compelling interest is implemented.4 1 The least restric-
religious belief; secular beliefs, however virtuous and admirable, will not suffice. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972) (determining claim that traditional Amish way of life was
not matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction); see also Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (finding determination of sincere religious belief diffi-
cult and delicate); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 (stating resolution of what belief or practice is enti-
tled to constitutional protection is delicate question). The question of the sincerity of
religious beliefs or practices may not be resolved by judicial perception of the adequacy, ac-
ceptability, or comprehensibility of the religious belief. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714. The role of
the courts is limited to determining whether the claim stems from an honest religious convic-
tion. Id. at 716.
The Supreme Court has found it necessary to evaluate the sincerity of religious beliefs or
practices in order to properly review free exercise claims and to ensure religious liberty. See
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987) (holding newly
adopted religious beliefs are fully protected and rejecting timing of conversion as factor in
determining whether free exercise is burdened); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16 (noting that nar-
row function of Court is to determine whether claimant terminated work because of honest
religious conviction); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222-29, 335-36 (providing clear example of Court
evaluating Amish culture to indicate objections were rooted in sincere religious beliefs).
For critiques of the sincerity requirement, see Noonan, How Sincere Do You Have to Be to Be
Religious?, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 713, 713-20 (examining United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78
(1944), in which sincerity requirement is generally thought to have originated) and Marshall,
The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
357, 385-88 (1990) (arguing that avoiding inquiry into sincerity and intensity of religious
claims alone supports abandoning free exercise exemptions). For a detailed discussion of the
threshold requirement that a sincerely-held religious belief must be burdened for a plaintiff to
prevail in a free exercise claim, see Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free
Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REV. 933, 947-60 (1989) (examining structure of free exercise
adjudication and components of free exercise challenge).
Determining the sincerity of beliefs, however, is inherently problematic. See id. at 954-57
(explaining that sincerity requirement seems to be best approach for separating bona fide
claims from fraudulent ones, but that sincerity determinations are fraught with various diffi-
culties). If a court is assigned the role of delving deeply into an asserted religious belief to
determine its sincerity, the court may become excessively entangled with the religion, thereby
violating the establishment clause of the first amendment. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 263 n.2 (1982) (arguing that adjudicating religious sincerity risks favoritism of one reli-
gion over another in violation of establishment clause). If courts must accept all asserted
religious beliefs on their face, however, there is a danger that a person may receive first
amendment protection of a personal or philosophical belief by merely stating, "My belief is
religious." Arguably, a court may be forced to accept such an assertion on its face to avoid
violating the establishment clause. Id. Although there is tension between the establishment
clause and the free exercise clause, the Court has resolved this tension in favor of promoting
free exercise. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987)
(stating that government may, and sometimes must, accommodate religion without violating
establishment clause); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972) (noting that there is
danger of violating establishment clause when granting religious exemption, but that danger
cannot preclude protection of values inherent in free exercise clause).
41. See Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141 (stating that infringement upon free exercise is justified
only by state proving compelling interest); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718 (suggesting state may
justify inroad on religious liberty by showing it is least restrictive means of achieving compel-
ling state interest); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (requiring that state's interest be compelling before
established religious practices must give way); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (establishing that only
compelling state interest may justify substantial infringement of first amendment right). For
an analysis of the compelling state interest test, see Gottleib, Compelling Governmental Interests:
An Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U.L. REV. 917,932-78 (1988)
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tive means requirement cannot be satisfied if the government can
exempt the religious group from the otherwise valid law and still
substantially achieve its legitimate goals.42
In Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist was discharged from her job
in South Carolina after refusing to work on Saturdays, the Sabbath
(analyzing and critiquing interests asserted by government in support of restricting individual
rights) and McConnell & Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. Cm.
L. REv. 1, 45-54 (1980) (applying economic analysis compelling state interest).
For arguments calling for the elimination of the strict scrutiny test in the free exercise con-
text, see Kamenshine, Scrapping Strict Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4 CONsT. COMMENTARY 147,
147-54 (1987) (arguing that Supreme Court's penchant for maintaining nominal adherence to
strict review mandates that Court reformulate its free exercise analysis); Marshall, supra note
40, at 372 (concluding current free exercise jurisprudence disfavors exemptions); West, The
Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETnics & PUB. POL'y 591,
596-98 (1990) (positing that compelling state interest test leads to unpredictable results). But
see McConnell, supra note 14, at 1415, 1511-13 (arguing that Sherbert's interpretation of free
exercise clause is in accord with historical evidence and within intent of framers of Constitu-
tion); Comment, Free Exercise in the 1980s, supra note 24, at 540 (arguing for compelling state
interest test to be expanded to provide greater protection of religious liberty).
In a free exercise case, the state is required to show that an important goal can only be
achieved through uniform enforcement of the regulation at issue. L. TRIBE, supra note 26,
§ 14-13, at 1251. The state must demonstrate that the regulation pursues a compelling state
interest. See id. § 14-13, at 1251-75 (tracing evolution of requirement). In Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, the Supreme Court added the least restrictive alternative requirement to further ensure
religious freedom. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (noting that power to
regulate must not, in attaining permissible end, unduly infringe protected freedom). The
Court struck down a statute prohibiting solicitation of money or valuables to support a reli-
gious cause without a permit. Id. at 303. The Court reasoned that in the interest of public
welfare a state may regulate the time, place, and manner of solicitation, provided that the
"statute is narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct (that] constitute[s] a clear
and present danger to a substantial interest of the state .... Id. at 304, 311. To condition
the solicitation of aid for religious causes upon a license, however, the granting of which
rested on an administrative evaluation of what is a "religious cause," is to intrude upon the
exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution. Id. at 307; see also Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 113, 116 (1943) (striking down ordinance which amounted to license tax on
exercise of privilege guaranteed by Constitution and noting that ordinance was not narrowly
drawn to safeguard community against solicitation); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147,
160, 162 (1939) (finding regulations which abridged freedom of speech and press could have
been drawn to adequately serve purpose through less drastic means).
There is no established test for scrutinizing regulations that specifically limit the rights of
members of a religious group. Rather, any such regulation would be categorically overturned
as violative of the free exercise clause of the first amendment. See Employment Div. v. Smith,
110 S. Ct. 1595, 1599 (1990) (stating free exercise clause is violated when state bans act only
when it is performed for religious purpose or only because of religious belief displayed); Mc-
Daniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 627-29 (1978) (finding that government may not impose disabili-
ties on base of religious views or status); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944)
(holding government may not punish expression of religious doctrines it deems false).
42. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,406-09 (1963) (adopting compelling state inter-
est/least restrictive means mode of analysis in free exercise context and granting exemption
from unemployment compensation laws where state failed to show no less restrictive means of
achieving goals); see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981) (granting exemp-
tion accommodating religious practice where state failed to show intrusion on religious liberty
attained by least restrictive means); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-34 (1972) (ex-
empting Amish from mandatory school attendance law where evidence supported that accom-
modating religious objection would not frustrate state objectives or detract from welfare of
society).
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day of her faith.43 The Employment Security Commission denied
Sherbert's claim for unemployment compensation.44 Under South
Carolina law, to be eligible for unemployment benefits a claimant
must not only be available for work, but, absent good cause, must
accept suitable work when offered.45 The Commission determined
that Sherbert's refusal to work on Saturdays constituted a refusal to
accept suitable work, and made her ineligible for benefits. 46 Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority in Sherbert, noted that the state's
denial of unemployment benefits forced Sherbert to choose be-
tween abandoning her religious beliefs and receiving benefits, or
following her beliefs and forfeiting benefits.47 The Court reasoned
that imposing such a choice is as burdensome as instituting a fine for
worshipping on Saturdays. 48
The heavy burden on Sherbert's religion could only be justified
by a showing that the eligibility provisions of South Carolina's un-
employment benefits law served a compelling state interest.49 The
Supreme Court found, however, that the state's asserted interest in
preventing fraudulent claims for unemployment benefits was insuffi-
cient to justify the burden on Sherbert's first amendment rights.50
Furthermore, even if the state had demonstrated a compelling inter-
est, it failed to show that there were no alternative forms of regula-
tion available with a lesser impact on the free exercise of religion,
such as an exemption provision for those people who refused to
work for religious reasons. 51
The Supreme Court applied the compelling state interest/least
restrictive means test to sustain two other free exercise challenges of
statutory schemes that denied unemployment benefits to individuals
43. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399.
44. Id. at 399-400.
45. See id. at 400-01 & n.3 (providing pertinent sections of South Carolina Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 68-113 to -114 (Law. Co-op. 1962) (setting forth
eligibility requirements and disqualification for benefits)). The current provisions may be
found at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-35-110 to -120 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1989).
46. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401. The Commission's findings were sustained by the Court of
Common Pleas for Spartanburg County and affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
Id. at 401. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the state's eligibility requirements
did not infringe upon any of Sherbert's constitutional liberties because the Commission's in-
terpretations of the statute did not restrict her freedom of religion or prevent her from exer-
cising her religious beliefs "in accordance with the dictates of her conscience." Sherbert v.
Verner, 240 S.C. 286, 303-04, 125 S.E.2d 737, 746 (1962), rev'd, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
47. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 406.
50. Id. at 407-09.
51. Id. at 408-09. The Court distinguished the requirement at issue in Sherbert from
Braunfeld v. Brown, where granting an exemption presented an administrative problem which
would have rendered the statutory scheme unworkable. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408-09.
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refusing to work because of their religious beliefs. In Hobbie v. Un-
employment Appeals Commission of Florida,5 2 the Court reversed an or-
der by the Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission that denied
benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist who refused to work on her Sab-
bath day.53 Florida's unemployment compensation law prohibited
payment of benefits to anyone discharged as a result of "misconduct
connected with ... work." 54 The Unemployment Commission clas-
sified Hobbie's refusal to work on Saturday as "misconduct" under
the statute.55 The Supreme Court applied the Sherbert test and re-
versed the Commission's order denying benefits to Hobbie because
the refusal constituted a violation of the free exercise clause.56
Similarly, in Thomas v. Review Board,57 Thomas, a Jehovah's Wit-
ness employed by a military supplier, quit his job after being trans-
ferred to a department that manufactured parts for military tanks.
Thomas asserted that his religious beliefs prevented him from par-
ticipating in the manufacture of war materials. 58 Applying a strict
scrutiny analysis, the Court struck down the Indiana Employment
Review Board's denial of unemployment compensation benefits to
Thomas because it constituted a violation of his first amendment
right to freely exercise his religion.59 In a dissent which foreshad-
owed the current view of free exercise jurisprudence, Justice Rehn-
quist argued that a state is not required to conform general statutes
designed to advance the state's secular goals to the dictates of par-
ticular religious groups.60
52. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
53. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1987) (pro-
viding background of Hobbie's free exercise challenge).
54. See id. at 138 (citing FLA. STAT. § 443.101(1)(a) (1985)). The current, unchanged
statutory provision for disqualification of benefits may be found at FA. STAT. ANN.
§ 443.036(26) (West Supp. 1989).
55. See Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 139 (citing FLA. STAT. § 443.036(24) (1985) (providing defini-
tion of "misconduct")). The current statutory provision may be found at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 443.036(26) (West Supp. 1989). The Unemployment Appeals Commission affirmed the de-
nial of Hobbie's benefits and agreed that her refusal to work constituted "misconduct." Hob-
bie, 480 U.S. at 139. The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed. Hobbic v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 475 So. 2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (per curiam),
rev'd, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
56. Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141-44, 146.
57. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
58. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 709-13 (1981) (providing background of
Thomas' claim and state's denial of unemployment benefits).
59. See id. at 716-19 (applying Sherbert and concluding interest advanced by state was
insufficiently compelling to justify burden on Thomas' religious liberty).
60. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 707, 723 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf. Employment Div. v.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1605 (1990) (stating that "we cannot afford the luxury of deeming
presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does
not protect an interest of the highest order"). No other Justice joined Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Thomas. Ten years later, however, fourJustices joined Justice Scalia's majority opin-
ion in Employment Division v. Smith which found the Sherbert test inapplicable to challenges of
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C. Wisconsin v. Yoder-The Court Expands the Sherbert Test
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 61 the Court expanded the scope of the free
exercise clause beyond the facts of Sherbert and applied the strict
scrutiny test to a criminal law. 62 In Yoder, the respondents, members
of the Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative Mennonite
Church, were convicted of violating Wisconsin's criminal law requir-
ing compulsory attendance in school until the age of sixteen. 63 The
respondents believed that school attendance beyond the eighth
grade was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life.64 The
Amish believed that sending their children to high school jeopard-
ized their children's, as well as their own, chances for salvation.65
Writing for the Court, ChiefJustice Burger found Wisconsin's com-
pulsory school attendance law to be a severe and inescapable bur-
den on the Amish believers' right to freely exercise their religion.66
neutral, generally applicable criminal laws which incidentally impact an individual's religion.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602-06; see infra notes 126-99 and accompanying text (discussing Smith
holding).
Justice Stevens had previously expressed opposition to the strict scrutiny doctrine. In his
concurring opinion in United States v. Lee, Justice Stevens stated that the Constitution does not
require granting exemptions for generally applicable, neutral laws. See Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263
(1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing for adoption of different constitutional standard).
Justice Stevens' disapproval of strict review under the free exercise clause rests on his belief
that such review is violative of establishment clause principles. Id. at 263 n.2. Justice Stevens
reasoned that by engaging in strict review, the Court is forced to evaluate the legitimacy of
asserted religious beliefs, and thereby becomes excessively entangled with religion. Id.; see
supra note 40 (discussing tension between establishment clause and free exercise clause) and
supra note 41 (discussing requirements under strict scrutiny and noting arguments that stan-
dard should be eliminated).
61. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
62. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218-19 (1972).
63. Id. at 207-08 (reviewing Wis. STAT. § 118.15 (1969)).
64. Id. at 210-11. The Court, describing the Amish religion and way of life, stated:
[The Amish] view secondary school education as an impermissible exposure of their
children to a "worldly" influence in conflict with their beliefs. The high school tends
to emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, competi-
tiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students. Amish society empha-
sizes informal learning-through-doing; a life of "goodness," rather than a life of
intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge; community welfare, rather than
competition; and separation from, rather than integration with, contemporary
worldly society.
Id. at 211.
The Amish believe that their adolescent children should be home to learn the specific skills
and attitudes, including self-reliance and a love for manual labor, necessary to live as an adult
in the Amish community. Id. The Amish do not object to schooling through the eighth grade.
Id. at 212. Elementary school teaches children to read, so that they may read the Bible and
learn to be good farmers and citizens. Id. Although school attendance offers exposure to
non-Amish people, the Amish do not believe that it exposes their children at this younger age
to "worldly values" nor interferes with their religious development. Id. Higher education, on
the other hand, promotes values that alienate man from God. Id.
65. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210.
66. Id. at 218. Specifically, the Court stated: "Wisconsin law affirmatively compels [the
respondents], under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fun-
damental tenets of their religious beliefs.... [They] must either abandon belief and be assim-
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The Court in Yoder followed Sherbert and ruled that it was incum-
bent on the state to show with particularity how an exemption to the
compulsory school attendance law for the Amish would frustrate the
state's interest in ensuring that its youth receive an adequate educa-
tion. 67 The Court found that granting an exemption in this situa-
tion would not severely jeopardize the education of Amish
children.68 The Court explained that the informal vocational educa-
tion the Amish provide their children at home prepared them for
life in the insular agrarian society that is the foundation of their
community. 69 High school education, in comparison, is designed to
assimilate children into modem society.7 0 Thus, a state may only
constitutionally subject Amish children to high school education if
the state has a compelling interest in imposing modern society upon
the Amish.7 1 Finding no such compelling state interest, the Court
emphasized that "a way of life that is odd or even erratic but inter-
feres with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned
because it is different." 72
In virtually all free exercise cases since the Sherbert and Yoder deci-
sions, the Supreme Court subjected laws burdening religious prac-
tices to strict scrutiny.7 3 In each case outside the unemployment
ilated into society at large, or be forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant region."
Id.
67. Id. at 236.
68. Id. at 222.
69. Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1922) and discussing power of
parents to control their children's education).
70. See generally Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1986) (suggesting that school
environment is factor in development of impressionable young children); Board of Educ. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (describing school curriculum as vehicle for transmitting com-
munity values); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (finding school most pervasive means for promoting common destiny of our
democracy).
71. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972) (finding that one or two additional
years of formal education will do little to serve state's interest).
72. Id. at 223-24. The Court implicitly asserted that the Bill of Rights generally, and the
free exercise clause specifically, should be invoked as the protector of minority rights from the
majoritarian political process. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Jewish Congress in
Support of Respondents at 46-47, Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (No. 88-
1213) [hereinafter Brief of AmericanJewish Congress] (discussing important government in-
terest in allowing minority faiths to flourish even at risk of disparate treatment of faiths by
government). The Court's willingness to use the first amendment to protect religious liberty,
however, has faded in recent years. See infra notes 78-125 and accompanying text (discussing
decline of free exercise protection).
73. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (ap-
plying strict scrutiny test to overturn denial of unemployment benefits to employee who re-
fused to work on Sabbath Day of faith); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-60 (1982)
(finding that state satisfied burden imposed by Sherbert test); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707, 718-20 (1981) (reversing denial of unemployment benefits under strict scrutiny analysis
to employee who refused to work in weapons plant because of religious objection); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (using strict scrutiny analysis to require state to grant
Amish children exemption from mandatory school attendance law); Gillette v. United States,
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context, with the exception of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 74 the Court found
that the states' interests satisfied the compelling interest/least re-
strictive means test.75 Thus, although the Court did not explicitly
repudiate the strict scrutiny test of Sherbert, it has in recent years
refrained from extending constitutional protection to religious
liberty. 76
D. The Decline of First Amendment Free Exercise Protection
During the last decade, the Supreme Court was less willing to
grant religious exemptions under the strict scrutiny test. Although
the Court retained the test in theory, in most instances it shifted the
balance in favor of the state by interpreting the states' interests
broadly and the religious interests narrowly. 77 For instance, in
United States v. Lee, 78 a 1982 decision, the Court applied the test and
found the government interest sufficiently compelling to outweigh
the free exercise interest.79 The appellee in Lee, an Amish farmer,
refused to withhold social security taxes from his employees'
paychecks. 80 The farmer contended that paying social security taxes
401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971) (finding incidental burden on religion justified by substantial gov-
ernment interests).
In two recent cases involving free exercise challenges to governmental practices the Court
distinguished, but did not repudiate, Sherbert. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protec-
tive Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988) (emphasizing government coercion is necessary to
trigger heightened scrutiny); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700 (1986) (stating that free exer-
cise clause affords protection from government compulsion and does not afford individual
right to dictate conduct of government). The Court noted that the free exercise clause, via
the Court's application of the compelling state interest test, serves to protect individuals
against direct government coercion. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51; Roy, 476 U.S. at 700; see infra
notes 89-123 and accompanying text (discussing Roy and Lyng decisions).
74. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
75. See McConnell, supra note 14, at 1417 (considering continuing legitimacy of Sherbert
test and stating that at least two Justices, Rehnquist and Stevens, have openly declared oppo-
sition to doctrine).
76. Id. at 1417 n.29 (providing list of post-1972 cases where Court rejected free exercise
claims).
77. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452
(1988) (stating that "government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every
citizen's religious needs and desires"); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703, 711-12 (1986) (as-
serting that government requirement does not compel claimants to refrain from religious con-
duct); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-60 (1982) (stating that government interest in
social security system is apparent because coverage is nationwide and exemption for every
religious belief would be too difficult to accommodate). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 26,
§ 14-13, at 1251-75 (asserting that Court has lessened government's burden of persuasion in
recent free exercise cases).
78. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
79. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-60 (1982); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-04 (1983) (finding state interest in eradicating racial discrimination
in education satisfies strict scrutiny); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971) (find-
ing incidental burden on religion justified by substantial government interests).
80. Lee, 455 U.S. at 254. Lee also failed to file quarterly social security tax returns or pay
his employer's share of social security taxes. Id.
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and accepting social security benefits conflicted with the religious
belief that the Amish community should provide for its members
without the help of the Social Security Administration. 8' Writing
for the Court, ChiefJustice Burger agreed that paying social security
taxes was a genuine burden on the claimant's religious liberty.82 Es-
tablishing a burden, however, is the beginning, not the end of the
inquiry under the free exercise clause.83 The Court found that the
government's interest in a social security fund into which everyone
contributes is an interest of the "highest order."8' 4 The Court,
therefore, did not require the government to grant the Amish an
exemption.8 5 It would be virtually impossible to maintain the social
security system if the Court granted exemptions to every religious
group claiming that payment of social security taxes violated their
religion.8 6 The Lee decision began a movement away from the rigor-
ous protection of religious liberty which characterized the free exer-
cise cases of the preceding two decades.8 7
In Bowen v. Roy,88 another case involving the social security sys-
tem, a Native American challenged the government's use of a social
security number to identify his daughter.8 9 After speaking with a
chief of the Abenaki tribe from which he descended, Roy developed
the belief that the assignment of an identifying number to individu-
als robs them of their unique spirit and prevents them from ob-
taining great spiritual power.90
The Court reasoned that although the government's use of a so-
cial security number may have offended Roy's religious beliefs, it
81. Id. at 257.
82. Id.
83. Id. The Court stated that a "balance must be struck between the values of the com-
prehensive social security system, which rests on a complex of actuarial factors, and the conse-
quences of allowing religiously based exemptions." Id. at 259.
84. Id. at 260. Congress exempts self-employed members of established religious sects
who are conscientiously opposed to accepting benefits from payment of social security taxes.
26 U.S.C. § 1402(g)(1) (1988). When followers of a particular faith participate in commerce
as a matter of choice, they may not impose the limits of their own conduct on the statutory
scheme. Lee, 455 U.S. at 261. The Court in Lee stated that exempting employers like Lee
from paying social security taxes imposes their religious beliefs on their employees. Id.
85. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-61 (1982).
86. Id. at 259-60. The Court stated that "[tlo maintain an organized society that guaran-
tees religious freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some religious practices yield
to the common good. Religious beliefs can be accommodated .... but there is a point at
which accommodation would 'radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature.' " Id.
at 259 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).
87. See L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 14-13, at 1261 (discussing shrinking scope of free exer-
cise clause and suggesting that Court is subjecting certain categories of law to more careful
scrutiny).
88. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
89. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 695 (1986).
90. Id. at 696. Roy explained that "control over one's life is essential to spiritual purity
and indispensable to 'becoming a holy person.' " Id.
1446
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did not inhibit the practice of his religion.9 1 The Court interpreted
Roy's claim as a demand for the government to conform its adminis-
trative affairs to his religious beliefs. 92 The Court rejected the
claim, stating that although "[t]he Free Exercise Clause affords an
individual protection from certain forms of government compul-
sion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of
the Government's internal procedures. ' 93 Thus, the Court essen-
tially distinguished positive and negative free exercise rights.94 A
positive free exercise right enables a person to demand that the gov-
ernment structure its practices and laws in a way that is acceptable
to his or her religious beliefs. 95 A negative right encompasses the
right to be free from government practices that coerce or prohibit
religious activity.96 According to this analysis, Roy claimed a posi-
tive right and, therefore, the Court refused to extend first amend-
ment protection to his religious beliefs. 97 The Court's decision in
Roy suggests that the first amendment only protects the negative
right.98
In Part III of the Roy opinion,99 ChiefJustice Burger proposed a
"reasonable means" test to judge the constitutionality of all facially
neutral and uniformly applicable requirements for the receipt of
91. Id. at 699. The Court explained:
Never to our knowledge has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to require
the Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or
her spiritual development or that of his or her family. The free exercise clause sim-
ply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal
affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens ...
"[The Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to
the individual, not in terms of what the individual can extract from the government."
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Roy, 476 U.S. at 699-700. As a result, Roy may no more prevail on his religious objection to
the Government's use of a Social Security number for his daughter than he could on a sincere
religious objection to the size or color of the Government's filing cabinets.
92. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986).
93. Id. at 700.
94. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 14-13, at 1262-64. Professor Tribe asserts that
the Court affords higher scrutiny to rules that impose a choice between adherence to a reli-
gious belief and enjoyment of a government benefit. Id. at 1262. Rules that make the practice
of a particular faith more costly are given less scrutiny. Id. at 1262-63.
95. Roy, 476 U.S. at 700.
96. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 458-59
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (recognizing and disagreeing with Court's distinction be-
tween two categories of claims). Justice Brennan argues that the free exercise clause protects
against "any form of governmental action that frustrates or inhibits religious practice." Id. at
459.
97. Roy, 476 U.S. at 699.
98. Id. at 699-700 (stating free exercise clause prohibits government compulsion, but
does not provide individual with right to dictate government procedures).
99. Id. at 701-12. ChiefJustice Burger authored Parts I, II, and III of the Roy opinion.
OnlyJustices Powell and Rehnquistjoined Part III of the opinion. Id. at 694, 701-12. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor joined Parts I and
II.
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government benefits.' 0 0 Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, vehemently attacked Chief Justice Burger's pro-
posed "reasonable means" test.10 Although Justice O'Connor
agreed that an individual may not dictate the conduct of the Govern-
ment's internal procedures, she did not agree that all governmental
requirements for the receipt of benefits should be subjected to only
a rational basis test. 10 2 Justice O'Connor argued that Chief Justice
Burger's proposed test "relegates a serious First Amendment value
to the barest level of minimal scrutiny."' 03 She stated that the com-
pelling interest/least restrictive means test is the standard unequiv-
ocally required by the first amendment and is expressly embraced in
Court precedent.10 4
100. Id. at 707-08. ChiefJustice Burger argued that the government is entitled to wide
latitude in its administration of welfare programs reaching millions of people. Id. Absent
discriminatory intent, the government meets its burden if it demonstrates that the challenged
law is a "reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest." Id.
It is not clear whether ChiefJustice Burger was proposing that a "reasonable means" test
be used to scrutinize all neutral laws challenged under the free exercise clause or whether he
was proposing that laws involving the receipt of government benefits be given the more re-
laxed level of scrutiny. The opinion created a distinction between two types of neutral laws:
those creating a direct burden, as in Yoder, where individuals are forced to choose between
avoiding criminal prosecution and practicing their faith and those denying benefits, as in Roy,
where the government treats all individuals alike and does not make a case-by-case inquiry
into the sincerity of each religious objection. Id. at 707. ChiefJustice Burger argued that the
Court must afford greater deference to the latter type of government decision. Id.
On its face, ChiefJustice Burger's proposal for a "reasonable means" test directly conflicts
with the Court's decisions in Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie. See L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 14-13,
at 1262 n.68 (commenting upon impact of Roy decision). Chief Justice Burger explained,
however, that in their decisions to deny unemployment benefits in Sherbert, Thomas, and Hob-
bie, the states exhibited discriminatory intent when they found the refusal to work on religious
grounds not to be good cause. Roy, 476 U.S. at 708. Unlike the law at issue in Roy, the laws in
those cases did not involve government neutrality, but rather government hostility toward
religion. Id.; see also supra notes 37-60 and accompanying text (discussing Sherbert, Thomas, and
Hobbie).
The majority opinion in Roy is dangerous to free exercise claims. The opinion insulates the
stated government interest from first amendment scrutiny by characterizing it as an internal
affair. As a result, the Court did not consider the effect of a social security exemption upon
the government program nor the coercion of individual religious interests. See Comment, Free
Exercise in the 1980s, supra note 24, at 523-24 (analyzing decreased scrutiny for free exercise
infringement in public welfare cases). Furthermore, by characterizing the government's inter-
est as an internal affair, the Court eliminated the need to balance the government's interest
against the individual religious interest. Id. Affording such deference to facially neutral laws
removes laws with a potentially devastating effect on religious liberty from the ambit of consti-
tutional review. Id.
101. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 727 (1986) (O'Connor, J, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice O'Connor's opinion.
102. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 727 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
O'Connor argued that the Court has consistently held that "[o]nly an especially important
governmental interest pursued by narrowly tailored means can justify exacting a sacrifice of
First Amendment freedoms as the price for an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privi-
leges enjoyed by other citizens." Id. at 728 (O'Connor, J, concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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Four years after Roy, however, Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association,10 5
implicitly eschewed the Sherbert test and reached a result similar to
the Court's decision in Roy. 10 6 In Lyng, the Court refused to pro-
hibit the federal government from harvesting timber and construct-
ing a road through a portion of a northwestern California national
forest traditionally used for religious purposes by members of three
Native American tribes.10 7 The Court acknowledged that distur-
bance of the local environment precluded the Native Americans
from meaningfully practicing the traditional rituals which lead to
their spiritual development.10 8 The majority found, however, that
the free exercise clause did not prohibit the building of the road. 10 9
The Court reasoned that although the first amendment proscribes
the prohibition of the free exercise of religion, it does not allow in-
dividuals the right to veto government decisions incompatible with
their religious beliefs or practices. 10 According to this narrow in-
terpretation, the free exercise clause does not provide a right of re-
lief from government activity that makes the practice of religion
more difficult. 1 ' Instead, the Constitution only protects against
government coercion or prohibition of religious conduct. 112 The
Court asserted that the crucial word in the free exercise clause is
"prohibit.""13 Although the challenged government action signifi-
cantly interfered with the ability of Native Americans to pursue their
religious beliefs, the government action did not prohibit the exer-
105. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
106. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988).
According to Justice O'Connor's reading of free exercise precedent, her opinion in Lyng and
the Court's decision in Roy both adhere to the Sherbert doctrine. Id.
107. Id. at 441-42.
108. Id. at 451.
109. Id. at 452. Commentators have suggested that the Court exhibits a racial bias be-
cause it is more willing to uphold claims by Judeo-Christian religions, such as Jehovah's Wit-
nesses or the Amish, than claims by less popular religions. See, e.g., Comment,Judicial Scrutiny
of Native American Free Exercise Rights: Lyng and the Decline of the Yoder Doctrine, 17 ENVTL. AFF.
169, 171 (1989) (arguing that institutional racism causes courts to handle claims by Native
Americans differently from claims by members of "Western-style" religions); Note, Native
American Religious Freedom and the Peyote Sacrament. The Precarious Balance Between State Interests and
the Free Exercise Clause, 31 ARIz. L. REv. 423, 424 (1989) (arguing that judiciary is reluctant to
treat non-Judeo-Christian religions uniformly); Comment, First Americans and the First Amend-
ment, supra note 21, at 954 (asserting that Court does not fully understand Native American
culture and therefore does not adequately consider their free exercise right). But see United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-61 (1982) (refusing to uphold free exercise claim by Amish
employer).
110. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 450.
113. Id. at 451.
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cise of those beliefs."14 Furthermore, the government did not co-
erce or penalize religious conduct. 115
Although the Court did not require the government to show a
compelling interest in Lyng, neither did it claim to repudiate the
strict scrutiny test applied in past free exercise cases.' 6 Rather, the
Court followed the Roy decision which held that a law will be judged
under a strict scrutiny analysis only when it coerces individuals to
act contrary to their religious beliefs." 17 The Court in Lyng distin-
guished between an individual's attempt to exact behavior from the
government and an individual's request for an exemption from laws
that compel one to refrain from practicing a religion."18 Following
the Court's rationale in Lyng, a neutral law penalizing religious con-
duct, such as Wisconsin's criminal law requiring the Amish to send
their children to high school, should be subjected to strict scru-
tiny.19 The Court would not, however, extend constitutional pro-
tection to a law that simply makes it impossible for someone to
practice their religion because of the presence of a physical
obstacle.' 20
Throughout the history of free exercise jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court's reasoning in its opinions has varied significantly,
depending upon the particular claim and the historical period in
which the claim arose. In some cases, the Court afforded tremen-
dous deference to the state, ' 2 ' while in other cases, individual rights
114. Id. at 449 (discussing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)). The Court found Lyng
indistinguishable from Roy. Id
115. Id.
116. See id. at 450-53 (following analysis in Roy and deferring to government). The Court
emphasized that while Native Americans may have rights to use the land, the government
owns the land. Id. at 453.
117. Id. at 456-57 (following Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707-09 (1986)). The Court
stated that "the Constitution simply does not provide a principle that could justify upholding
respondents' legal claims. However much we might wish that it were otherwise, government
simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and
desires." Id. at 452.
118. Id. at 451.
119. Id. at 450.
120. Id. A law penalizing religious conduct and a governmental action making the prac-
tice of religion impossible have the identical effect of severely inhibiting the free exercise of
religion. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 459 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's creation of categories of free exercise rights).
Justice Brennan argued in the Lyng dissent that the Constitution does not draw a fine distinc-
tion between the types of restraints government may use, but rather that the first amendment
protects individuals from any governmental action that inhibits the free exercise of religion.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that both "common sense" and precedent
inform us that governmental action rendering the practice of religion difficult or impossible
necessarily penalizes the free exercise of that religion. Such governmental action, reasoned
Justice Brennan, "tends to prevent adherence to religious belief." Id. at 469 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
121. See, e.g., id. at 452 (arguing that government could not operate if required to satisfy
every citizen's religious needs); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (stating that govern-
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received deference.1 22 The Supreme Court has made it clear that an
individual cannot demand that the government structure its activi-
ties to accommodate religion. 123 The Court had not ruled, how-
ever, that all neutral laws having an impact on religion, as opposed
to laws that merely offend religious beliefs, are immune from first
amendment protection.124 In Employment Division v. Smith, a five Jus-
tice majority resolved the ambiguities attending free exercise doc-
trine by broadly holding that the compelling state interest test shall
not be used to judge neutral laws that adversely impact religious
liberty. 125
II. EMPLOYMENT DIVISION v. SMITH
A. Facts and Procedural History
The respondents in Employment Division v. Smith,126 members of
the Native American Church, were discharged from their positions
as drug abuse counselors after their employer discovered they had
ingested peyote for sacramental purposes during a church cere-
mony.1 27 The use of non-prescription drugs was contrary to the
ment cannot structure its affairs to comport with religious beliefs of particular citizens);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (asserting that every person cannot be free
from all burdens incident to exercising religious beliefs); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437, 461 n.23 (1971) (narrowing scope of conscientious objector's free exercise claim). See
supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which Court found state action
to satisfy compelling state interest test).
122. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987) (stat-
ing that first amendment protects free exercise rights of employees even if beliefs change after
employee is hired); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981) (discussing sincerity
of claimant's religious belief and government's substantial infringement on free exercise);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (finding fundamental claim of religious free-
dom worthy of searching inquiry); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (asserting
that rational basis deference to government will not suffice in sensitive area of first amend-
ment rights); see supra notes 37-76 and accompanying text (discussing successful free exercise
challenges under strict scrutiny test).
123. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452; Roy, 476 U.S. at 699.
124. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 258-60 (applying compelling state interest test, but finding that
state satisfied burden imposed by test); Gillette, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971) (finding incidental
burden on religion justified by compelling government interest); see supra notes 37-87 and
accompanying text (discussing scope and applicability of strict scrutiny test).
125. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1603 (1990).
126. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
127. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1597-98. Peyote is both the God that members of the Native
American Church worship and the vehicle for experiencing the "deity." People v. Woody, 61
Cal. 2d 716, 720-21, 394 P.2d 813, 816-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72-74 (1964). See generally Brief
of American Jewish Congress, supra note 72, at 14-23, 35 n.20 (discussing history of use of
peyote and disparate treatment of Native Americans by Court). Anthropologists have ascer-
tained, through discussions with members of the Church, that this Native American religion
combines certain Christian teachings with the belief that peyote embodies god and that those
who partake in the peyote ritual become close to the Holy Spirit. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 720-21,
394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 730. Use of peyote outside the ritual, however, is sacrile-
gious. Id. Statutorily proscribing use of peyote by the members of the Native American
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stated policy of the respondents' employer.128 Oregon law classifies
peyote as a "controlled substance," and makes intentional posses-
Church removes the "theological heart" of the religion; without peyote, members cannot
practice their religion. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 722, 394 P.2d at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
The American Jewish Congress, in its Amicus brief for the respondents, stated:
Peyote is more than a sacrament of the Native American religion-it is the basis of
the religion itself. If the religious practice is prohibited, the religion dies. No graver
danger can be imagined. It is doubtful that any other religious adherents who have
sought religious exemptions from drug laws would suffer similar harm. In most
other cases, the religious use of drugs is an aid to religious experience; rarely, as with
peyote, is it the essence of the religion itself.
Brief of American Jewish Congress, supra note 72, at 5.
The sacred ceremony where members of the church ingest peyote is the cornerstone of
peyotism. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 720-21, 394 P.2d at 817-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72-73. In its
Amicus Curiae Brief, the Association on American Indian Affairs described the ritual:
To the members, peyote is consecrated with powers to heal body, mind and spirit. It
is a teacher; it teaches the way to spiritual life through living in harmony and balance
with the forces of the Creation. The rituals are an integral part of the life process.
They embody a form of worship in which the sacrament Peyote is the means for
communicating with the Great Spirit.
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Association on American Indian Affairs, at 5-6, Employment Div.
v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (No. 88-1213) [hereinafter Brief of Association on American
Indian Affairs].
Peyote grows in small buttons on the top of the Lophophora williamsii, a small cactus found
primarily in northern Mexico and the Rio Grande Valley of Texas. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d. at 720-
21, 394 P.2d at 816-17, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72-73. It contains mescaline, which gives peyote its
hallucinogenic properties. Id. When swallowed, peyote causes a variety of hallucinations, de-
pending upon the user, including heightened sensitivity or distortion of colors and sounds,
heightened aesthetic appreciation, revelations of truth, and increased comprehension. Id.
Additionally, peyote induces feelings of euphoria and engenders strong feelings of love and
friendliness towards others. Id. Peyote, however, has a horrible, bitter taste, often causing
those who ingest it to vomit immediately after chewing it. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1619 n.7
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing E. ANDERSON, PEYOTE: THE DIVINE CACTus 161 (1980) and
explaining that unpleasant side effect discourages recreational use).
During the peyote ceremony, which typically convenes at sundown on Saturday and contin-
ues until sunrise the next morning, members of the Church ingest peyote to give thanks for
past good fortune and to find guidance for future conduct. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 721, 394 P.2d
at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73. Although whole families attend and partake in these ceremonies,
children and young women do not ingest peyote. Id.
Before the members depart from the ceremony at sunrise on Sunday morning, they partake
in a brief prayer, and the host of the ceremony and his family serve the members breakfast. Id.
The effects of peyote wear off by Sunday morning; those who participate in the ritual do not
experience any side effects. Id.
A variety of tribes including Navajos from Arizona and tribes from California, Montana,
Oklahoma, Wisconsin, Oregon, and Saskatchewan, Canada practice Peyotism. Id. While
there is no recorded dogma of the Church, the rituals and beliefs among adherents are quite
similar. Id. A 1972 estimate showed membership in the Church to be approximately 300,000.
See Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 459 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1972)(finding regulation distinguishing two churches using sacramental peyote arbitrary on due
process grounds). Peyotism began in Mexico and has spread throughout the United States
and Canada. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 720-21, 394 P.2d at 816-17,40 Cal. Rptr. at 72-73. Legend
suggests that the religious use of peyote began with the Aztecan people of central Mexico. See
Note, Native American Religious Freedom, supra note 109, at 423-24 (describing history of peyote
use by Native Americans). Spanish historical sources from 1560 refer to Peyotism among
Native Americans in Mexico. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 720-21, 394 P.2d at 816-17, 40 Cal. Rptr. at
72-73. There is definitive documentation that Peyotism was well-established in the United
States during the late nineteenth century. Id.
128. Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 662 (1988) (Smith I).
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sion of peyote a felony.12 9 The respondents, Smith and Black, ap-
plied for unemployment compensation after being fired, but the
Employment Division denied their claims.' 30 The Employment Di-
vision determined that Smith and Black were ineligible to receive
unemployment benefits because their termination resulted from
work-related misconduct.' 3' The Oregon Court of Appeals re-
versed the denial of benefits and the Oregon Supreme Court af-
firmed. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the denial of
unemployment benefits to people fired as a result of practicing their
religion violated the free exercise clause.' 3 2 The court found the
loss of unemployment benefits to be a substantial burden on the
respondents' right to freely exercise their religion.' 33 The court
held that the state's financial interest in denying unemployment
benefits was insufficiently compelling to overcome the respondents'
constitutional rights.' 3 4
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court first heard the Smith
case.13 5 The Employment Division argued that denial of benefits to
Smith and Black was valid because peyote consumption is illegal.' 36
The Court agreed and remanded the case to the Oregon Supreme
Court for a determination of whether Oregon's controlled sub-
stance laws provided an exemption for the religious use of pe-
yote.' 37 The United States Supreme Court reasoned that if a state
criminally prohibits certain religiously motivated conduct without
129. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987). Oregon law prohibits possession of a "con-
trolled substance" unless the substance was obtained directly from or pursuant to a valid
prescription or order of a licensed medical practitioner. Id The statute defines "controlled
substance" as "a drug or its immediate precursor classified in Schedules I through V under
the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. sections 811 to 812 .... Id. The Oregon
State Board of Pharmacy, under its statutory authority classifies peyote as a Schedule I drug.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1597 (1990). Persons who knowingly or inten-
tionally possess a Schedule I substance, under Oregon law, are "guilty of a Class B felony."
OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4)(a) (1987).
130. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1598.
131. Id. The Court in Smith I noted that the Oregon Administrative Rules define miscon-
duct as "a willful violation of the standards of behavior which an employer has the right to
expect of an employee." Smith I, 485 U.S. at 664 (quoting OR. ADMIN. R. 471-30-038(3)
(1987)). The Oregon Revised Statutes state that if an employee is terminated for "miscon-
duct," unemployment compensation is not available. OR. REv. STAT. § 657.176(2)(a) (1987).
132. Smith v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 209, 217-19, 721 P.2d 445, 449-50 (1986), reh'g
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990).
133. Id. at 218, 721 P.2d at 450 (citing Sherbert v. Verner and Thomas v. Review Board to
require state to demonstrate compelling interest).
134. Id. at 219-20, 721 P.2d at 450-51 (noting that legality of peyote is not relevant to
respondent's first amendment claim).
135. Employment Div. v. Smith (Smith I), 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
136. Id. at 663 n.5.
137. Id. at 673-74. The Oregon Supreme Court had not decided whether the state's pro-
scription of peyote was enforceable against the Native American Church. Whether the state
allowed an exemption for religious use of peyote was, therefore, an issue of dispute between
the parties. Id.
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violating the first amendment, it may impose the lesser burden of
denying benefits to persons who engage in that conduct. 3 8 Thus,
the Court implied that the relevant issue was whether the free exer-
cise clause required Oregon to exempt the Native American Church
from the state's law criminalizing peyote possession.13 9
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the statute
makes no exception for religiously inspired use of peyote. 140 The
court, however, reaffirmed its previous ruling that the first amend-
ment prohibited the state from denying unemployment benefits to
Smith and Black for the religious use of peyote. 141 The United
States Supreme Court again granted certiorari.1 42 The issue to be
addressed this time was whether the United States Constitution re-
quires Oregon to exempt the sacramental use of peyote from its
general law proscribing peyote possession.' 43
138. Id at 670.
139. Id. at 672-73 (declining to decide constitutionality of this issue if Oregon exempted
Native American Church from law).
140. Smith v. Employment Div., 307 Or. 68, 72-73, 763 P.2d 146, 147-48 (1986), reh'g
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990).
141. Id.
142. 109 S. Ct. 1526 (1989).
143. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1597 (1990).
The respondents argued that because there is no proof that moderate use of peyote is dan-
gerous, there is no compelling state interest in preventing religious use of the substance.
Brief for Respondents at 27, Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (No. 88-1213)
[hereinafter Respondents' Brief]; see also Oral Argument of Respondents at 36-37, Employ-
ment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (No. 88-1213) (Anderson Reporting Co.) [herein-
after Respondents' Oral Argument] (referring to question of whether free exercise clause
permits state prohibition of sacramental peyote use as issue presented in case). The respon-
dents also stated that peyote, unlike marijuana, is not widely used or distributed. See Respon-
dents' Brief, supra, at 28-29 (explaining that drug enforcement officials seize less than three
pounds of peyote per year); see also Respondents' Oral Argument, supra, at 43 (arguing that
peyote does not contribute to drug enforcement problems). Thus, the respondents claimed
that granting a religious exemption for peyote would not frustrate the state's interest in con-
trolling its use outside the religious context. Respondents' Brief, supra, at 36; see also Respon-
dents' Oral Argument, supra, at 37 (stating that state has conceded that sincere religious belief
exists in this case).
The petitioner argued that the state's interest was compelling. Brief for Petitioner at 11,
Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (No. 88-1213) [hereinafter Petitioner's
Brief]; see also Oral Argument of Petitioner at 11-12, Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
1595 (1990) (No. 88-1213) [hereinafter Petitioner's Oral Argument] (focusing on powerful
and potent effects of peyote and fact that all jurisdictions regulate its use). During oral argu-
ment, petitioner argued that because peyote is an unpredictable drug and indistinguishable
from other hallucinogens, the state of Oregon chose to regulate it without exemption. Peti-
tioner's Oral Argument at 11-12. The petitioner concluded it was impossible to serve both
the state's interest and accommodate the respondent's religion. Petitioner's Brief, supra, at 16
(concluding that accommodation is impossible because those who use peyote for religious use
are not necessarily set apart from those who use it for other purposes).
Before the ruling in Smith, a number of state courts had addressed the issue of sacramental
peyote use and its relationship to the free exercise clause. In 1926, the Montana Supreme
Court held that the first amendment of the United States Constitution did not require the
Montana legislature to exempt peyote use by members of the Native American Church from
its law proscribing possession of peyote. State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 239, 243 P. 1067,
1073 (1926). The Montana Supreme Court reasoned that the free exercise clause protects
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B. The Supreme Court's Decision
In a six-three decision, the Supreme Court held that the United
States Constitution does not require states to exempt sacramental
peyote use from their drug laws. 144  Only five justices, however,
agreed that the strict scrutiny test should no longer apply to neutral
laws that inhibit the free exercise of religion. 145 The majority opin-
practices that are inconsistent with the good order, peace, or safety of the state. Id. In State v.
Soto, the Oregon Court of Appeals prevented an application of the Sherbert balancing test by
refusing to allow any evidence demonstrating that Soto's possession of peyote was for use in a
religious ceremony. State v. Soto, 21 Or. App. 794, 799-800, 537 P.2d 142, 144 (1975).
Other courts, however, have held that sacramental peyote use is protected by the free exer-
cise clause. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals applied the Sherbert balancing test and found no
compelling state justification for inhibiting the rights of Native American Church members.
Whitehorn v. State, 561 P.2d 539, 544-45 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977). Similarly, the California
Supreme Court applied the Sherbert test and found that the state failed to demonstrate any
harmful consequences to those who use peyote for religious purposes. People v. Woody, 61
Cal. 2d 716, 723, 394 P.2d 813, 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74 (1964). Additionally, the court
found that California's ability to enforce its peyote laws for non-religious purposes would not
be frustrated by exempting religious peyote use. Id. See generally Note, Native American Reli-
gious Freedom, supra note 109, at 425-45 (discussing state court treatment of free exercise
clause and religious use of peyote and other drugs by both Native Americans and non-Native
Americans).
Congress expressed a concern for the fate of Native American religions by passing the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988). AIRFA provides
in pertinent part that:
[I]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American
Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the tradi-
tional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, includ-
ing but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to
worship through ceremonies and traditional rites.
Id. (emphasis added). Congress acknowledged that certain substances, such as peyote, "have
religious significance because they are sacred, they have power, they heal, they are necessary
to the exercise of the rites of the religion, they are necessary to the cultural integrity of the
tribe, and, therefore, religious survival." H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1262, 1263.
AIRFA is not self-enforcing. AIRFA, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988). The Act directs various
federal departments, agencies, and other bodies responsible for administering relevant laws
to consult with Native American religious leaders and formulate policies to determine what
changes are necessary to preserve the Native American culture and protect its religious prac-
tices. See Comment,Judicial Scrutiny, supra note 109, at 181-84 (providing detailed discussion
of AIRFA and noting that Act does not impose penalties for non-compliance and does not
establish standards ofjudicial review of federal agency decisions).
The federal government further protects the Native American Church by exempting bona
fide religious peyote use from classification as a Schedule I controlled substance. 21 C.F.R.
§ 1307.31 (1990). Church members engaged in the use of peyote for religious purposes,
therefore, are immune from prosecution under the federal Controlled Substances Act which
criminalizes, among other substances, the use and possession of peyote. 21 U.S.C.
§ 812(c)(12) (1988).
The Supreme Court in Smith did not mention AIRFA nor the exemption of the Native
American Church from the federal law criminalizing peyote. Accordingly, the Court did not
find that AIRFA or the federal exemption prevents states from outlawing use of peyote for
sacramental purposes. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1595-1606 (1990)
(failing to discuss AIRFA or exemption). But see id. at 1622 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (assert-
ing that majority's opinion makes both free exercise clause and AIRFA "an unfulfilled and
hollow promise").
144. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602 (1990).
145. ChiefJustice Rehnquist, andJustices White, Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy joined the
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ion, written by Justice Scalia, found that the "text" of the first
amendment does not mandate a ruling in favor of the respon-
dents.' 46 The first amendment to the Constitution, which forbids
government prohibition of the free exercise of religion, only pre-
vents the government from intentionally punishing or compelling
religious beliefs or practices. 147 To find that the first amendment
protects religious interests incidentally burdened by a neutral law,
reasoned the Court, carries the meaning of the first amendment be-
yond its intended scope.' 48 The majority concluded that a society
consisting of diverse religious groups cannot afford the "luxury" of
granting exemptions, under the strict scrutiny test, to neutral state
laws that burden the free exercise of religion. 149
opinion of the Court. Justice O'Connor concurred. Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Mar-
shall joined Parts I and II of the concurrence. Id. at 1597. Justice Blackmun dissented, joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id.
146. Id. at 1599.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1605. Presently, Congress is considering the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1990, which would codify the strict scrutiny test. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1990: Hearing on H.R. 5377 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 136 CONG. REc. D1202 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990).
In a recent article discussing the role of religion-based exemptions from neutral laws in
United States legal history, Professor McConnell of the University of Chicago Law School
argued that the framers of the Constitution believed religious exemptions were necessary to
satisfy the commitment to religious pluralism among the states. McConnell, supra note 14, at
1515-16. He argued that James Madison contemplated religious factions as "a source of
peace and stability." Id. at 1515 (discussing THlE FEDERALIST Nos. 10 and 51 U. Madison)).
Because of the inherent checks and balances in a system with many factions, no one group, no
matter how intolerant or fanatical, is capable of oppressing any other group. Id. This per-
spective, argued Professor McConnell, "is consistent with an aggressive interpretation of the
free exercise clause, which protects the interests of religious minorities in conflict with the
wider society and thereby encourages the proliferation of religious factions." Id. Accord-
ingly, granting an exemption to the respondents in Smith would not be a "luxury," as the
Supreme Court characterized it, but rather would be necessary to further the vision of reli-
gious pluralism upon which the first amendment, and indeed, our nation, was founded. See id.
(extolling virtue of encouraging proliferation of number of religious groups and increasing
vigor of small ones).
Conversely, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, the Court cited THE FED-
ERALIST No. 10 to support its refusal to compel the federal government to accommodate the
religious interests of the claimants. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 452 (1988). The Court noted that THE FEDERALIST No. 10 suggests that the evils of
religious factionalism are best restrained through competition among religious sects. Id. The
Court, however, cited No. 10 after the Court's contention that "[t]he Constitution does not,
and courts cannot, offer to reconcile the various competing demands on government, many of
them rooted in sincere religious belief, that inevitably arise in so diverse a society as ours.
That task, to the extent that it is feasible, is for the legislatures and other institutions." Id.
Thus, the Lyng Court used THE FEDERALIST No. 10 to support a proposition, very similar to
the proposition in Smith, that religious accommodation must be left to the political process.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606 (1990).
The Court in Smith did not replace the compelling state interest test with a rational basis
test. Id. at 1603. As the issue in the case involved neutral, generally applicable laws, the
Court did not need to articulate a rational basis test. The Court stated that "the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that
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The Court surveyed Supreme Court free exercise jurisprudence
to support its interpretation of the first amendment as having an
intended limited scope. The Court cited Reynolds v. United States,150
the nineteenth century decision which asserted that allowing a per-
son to violate laws contrary to one's religious belief elevates reli-
gious belief above the law and, in effect, "permits every citizen to
become a law unto himself."'' The Court also cited Lee, Lyng, and
Roy as examples of the Court's recent movement away from apply-
ing the strict scrutiny test.' 52
With extraordinary rigor, the majority distinguished Smith from
each case that suggested the religious use of peyote should be ex-
empt from generally applicable laws proscribing its use.' 53 The
Court noted that the compelling state iterest test enunciated in
Sherbert and applied in Thomas and Hobbie has only been used to in-
validate government action in the context of unemployment com-
pensation.154 Although the basis of the respondents' claim in Smith
was a request for unemployment compensation, the Court held that
the Sherbert test did not apply because the challenged law was a crim-
inal prohibition.'55 The majority stated that regardless of whether
the Court wished to extend Sherbert beyond the confines of unem-
ployment compensation, it would not apply the compelling state in-
his religion proscribes (or prescribes).'" Id. at 1600. But see Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,
707-08 (1986) (advocating rational basis test as standard of review for free exercise challenges
to uniformly applied governmental benefits requirements).
150. 98 U.S. 145 (1879); see supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text (discussing
Reynolds).
151. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1600 (1990) (quoting Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879)). The Court also cited a variety of other pre-Sher-
bert cases which upheld legislation against free exercise challenges. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600;
see, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 410 U.S. 437, 461 (1971) (upholding military selective ser-
vice system against challenge by persons opposing conscription on religious grounds); Braun-
feld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961) (plurality opinion) (upholding Sunday closing law
against claim that law burdened those who worship on Saturday); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 171 (1944) (holding that mother can be prosecuted under child labor laws for using
child to distribute religious literature).
152. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602-03; see supra notes 78-120 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Lee, Lyng, and Roy).
153. Id. at 1599-1603.
154. Id at 1602; see supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text (discussing Thomas and
Hobbie).
155. Id. at 1603.
The Court also distinguished Sherbert because of the "good cause" provision in the statute
reviewed in Sherbert. Id. The Court in Smith reasoned that because South Carolina maintained
a mechanism for exemptions, denying unemployment compensation because the claimant
lacked "good cause" enabled the state to discriminate against religions it did not deem worthy
of accommodation. Id. Using this logic, the Court distinguished Smith from Sherbert, arguing
that Sherbert involved a direct act of religious discrimination, whereas in Smith, there was no
discrimination, but only incidental impact. Id. The free exercise clause protects the former,
reasoned the Court, but the first amendment's scope does not extend to neutral laws that
incidentally impact religious liberty. Id.
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terest test to require an exemption from a neutral criminal law. 156
The Court in Smith also distinguished Yoder. In Yoder, the Court
exempted the Amish from a generally applicable, neutral criminal
law that incidentally burdened the free exercise rights of the
Amish. 15 7 The Court found that the state's interest in requiring
Amish children under the age of sixteen to attend school was not
compelling, and that the state's general interest in education could
have been accommodated by less restrictive means. 158 The respon-
dents in Smith argued that the peyote ritual is vital to the Native
American Church.' 59 Thus, like the Amish in Yoder, the Native
American Church is severely burdened by a criminal law the applica-
tion of which does not affect the free exercise rights of the vast ma-
jority of people who come under its control.160 The Court in Smith,
however, claimed that in Yoder, the state was required to demon-
strate a compelling interest only because the case was a "hybrid,"
involving not only a free exercise claim, but a free exercise claim
combined with parental rights.161 The majority opinion did not ad-
dress why a free exercise claim, in order to receive protection, must
be made in conjunction with another right not specifically enumer-
ated in the Constitution. 162
The philosophical, jurisprudential thread that ties the majority
opinion together in Smith is adherence to the doctrine of judicial
restraint. 63 The Court concluded that because the text of the Con-
156. Id. The Court implied that the Sherbert test would no longer be applicable for review
of criminal laws. Id. The Court, however, attacked Sherbert on a broader basis throughout the
opinion. See id. at 1602-04 (describing limited applicability of Sherbert). The message of Smith
is that all neutral, generally applicable laws will now be immune from any free exercise chal-
lenge. See id. at 1600 (maintaining that religious beliefs have never exempted individuals from
"compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the state is free to
regulate").
157. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601; see also supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Yoder).
158. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
159. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1613 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
160. See id. (noting that Oregon's prohibition on peyote presents members of Native
American Church with choice between facing criminal sanctions or refraining from practice of
their religion).
161. Id. at 1601-02. The right of parents to direct the education of their children was
established in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The Court also argued that
Cantwell v. Connecticut was a "hybrid" decision involving free exercise and free speech. Smith,
l10 S. Ct. at 1601.
162. See id. at 1601-02 (stating that only when free exercise has been linked with another
constitutional right has first amendment barred application of generally applicable law to re-
ligiously motivated activity).
163. See id. at 1606 (stating that religious accommodation is role of legislature, not
courts).
Judge Wallace of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that
[T]he overall and abstract conception ofjudicial restraint.., is that to avoid usurp-
ing the policymaking role of democratically elected bodies and officials, a judge
should always be hesitant to declare statutes or governmental actions unconstitu-
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stitution does not compel a holding in favor of the Native American
Church, the decision to grant an exemption for religious use of pe-
yote should be left to the democratic political process, not the judi-
ciary.i16 The Court warned that society would be "courting
anarchy" if every person claiming that a law or government practice
offends his or her religious beliefs were able to have the law or prac-
tice invalidated by the courts. 165 The danger of anarchy increases,
reasoned the Court, as the diversity of religious consciences
increases.166
The majority opinion in Smith indicated a preference for demo-
cratic majoritarian government over individual rights.' 67 The Court
acknowledged that minority religions will be at a "relative disadvan-
tage" if their destinies are left to majoritarian choices. 168 The ma-
jority stated, however, that this disadvantage is an "unavoidable
consequence of democratic government," and is preferable to a sys-
tem in which every "conscience is a law unto itself or in which
judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality
of all religious beliefs." 169 The Court reasoned that making an indi-
vidual's duty to obey the law contingent upon the government dem-
onstrating a compelling state interest would produce a
"constitutional anomaly" that contradicts both constitutional tradi-
tional and cautious to supplement or modify statutes when construing them. Courts
should make as little social policy as possible consistent with deciding properly
presented controversies.
Wallace, The Jurisprudence ofJudicial Restraint: A Return to the Moorings, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1,
8 (1981).
164. Smith, I10 S. Ct. at 1606.
165. Id. at 1605. The Court argued that to presumptively invalidate all neutral laws that
burden the free exercise of religion would affect every conceivable kind of civic obligation. Id.
The Court listed an array of areas that potentially would be subjected to free exercise exemp-
tions: compulsory military service, payment of taxes, social welfare legislation, health and
safety regulations, compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws, traffic laws, animal cruelty laws,
environmental protection laws, and laws providing for equality of opportunity among the
races. Id. at 1605-06.
166. Id. at 1605. Contrary to the view of the United States Supreme Court in Smith, the
California Supreme Court, in People v. Woody, found that the protection of religious groups
through constitutional exemptions would enrich our culture by providing diversity and en-
hancing self-expression. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 725-26, 394 P.2d 813, 821-22, 40
Cal. Rptr. 69, 76-77 (1964). The California court stated:
In a mass society, which presses at every point toward conformity, the protection of a
self-expression, however unique, of the individual and the group becomes ever more
important. The varying currents of the subcultures that flow into the mainstream of
our national life give it depth and beauty. We preserve a greater value than an an-
cient tradition when we protect the rights of the Indians who honestly practiced an
old religion in using peyote one night at a meeting in a desert hogan ....
Id.
167. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606 (1990).
168. Id.
169. Id.
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tion and common sense. 170
C. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor concurred in the result of Smith, reasoning that
Oregon has a compelling state interest in controlling drug abuse
and that a religious exemption to the law proscribing peyote would
frustrate Oregon's interest. 171 Justice O'Connor, however, vehe-
mently disagreed with the Court's abrogation of the compelling
state interest test. 172 According to Justice O'Connor, the decision
departs from first amendment jurisprudence and our Nation's com-
mitment to religious freedom. 173
While the majority meticulously examined each free exercise case
applying the strict scrutiny test to find some element that distin-
guished it from Smith, Justice O'Connor examined free exercise doc-
trine as a whole. She found that the essence of prior freedom of
religion cases reveals a commitment to the protection of religious
liberty by requiring government to accommodate religious liberty
wherever possible.174 According to Justice O'Connor, the free exer-
170. Id. at 1603-04. Justice O'Connor argued in the concurring opinion that "[tihere is
nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability" and that the strict scrutiny test
should be applied because "the First Amendment unequivocally makes freedom of religion,
like freedom from race discrimination and freedom of speech, a 'constitutional norm,' not an
anomaly." Id. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court turned this argument against
Justice O'Connor, noting that in the area of racial discrimination, when a neutral law dispro-
portionately disadvantages a particular race, the government is not required to justify the law
or practice with a showing of a compelling state interest. Id. at 1604 n.3 (citing Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). Likewise, argued the Court, neutral laws that have the effect of
inhibiting free speech are not subject to first amendment strict scrutiny. Id. (citing Citizen
Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969)). Although the Court's analogy is per-
suasive, the fact that Smith is in accord with a trend away from active protection of civil rights
is not comforting. The Court implied that it will extend constitutional protection to civil
rights only in cases where discrimination can be clearly shown. See id. (reviewing cases that
show Court has not offered constitutional protection in civil rights area when laws have effect
of interfering with constitutional rights). The vast majority of constitutional challenges, how-
ever, are brought against neutral but indifferent laws. See id. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (noting that "our free exercise cases have all concerned generally applicable laws that
had the effect of significantly burdening a religious practice"). Rarely will a government vio-
late civil rights with a blatantly discriminatory law. Id. (O'ConnorJ, concurring). In the vast
majority of cases where free speech, racial equality, or religious liberty are infringed, there
will be no means of redress-no requirement that the government show a compelling state
interest to justify a law that burdens civil rights. See id. (O'ConnorJ, concurring) (noting that
for first amendment to have any vitality, it must apply to more than merely those cases where
state has directly targeted religious activity).
171. Id. at 1615 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 1606 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
agreed with Justice O'Connor that the strict scrutiny standard should remain as the protector
of religious liberty in this country. Id. (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
173. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
174. See id. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (advocating application of compelling state
interest test). Justice O'Connor chastised the majority for its erroneous interpretation and
recharacterization of precedent. See id. at 1609-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that
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cise clause requires a government to justify, under the compelling
state interest test, all laws that have the effect of either coercing or
prohibiting religious beliefs or practices. 175
Justice O'Connor acknowledged that only religious beliefs receive
absolute first amendment protection, but she argued that because
belief and conduct are not neatly distinguishable and because the
first amendment does not differentiate between belief and conduct,
the Constitution presumptively protects religious conduct. 176 Any
law that prohibits a particular religious practice, reasoned Justice
O'Connor, necessarily inhibits the right to freely exercise one's reli-
gion. 177 Justice O'Connor argued that the majority ignored the pro-
tected status of religious conduct and baselessly eliminated the well-
entrenched protector of both religious conduct and belief, the com-
pelling state interest test.' 78
Unlike the majority, Justice O'Connor did not fear that granting
religious exemptions to otherwise valid laws would result in anarchy
or the opening of the floodgates of litigation.' 79 She argued that
Court eschewed principles of prior decisions by labeling them "hybrid" cases). She asserted
that what the majority labeled hybrid decisions-Yoder and Cantwel--expressly relied on the
free exercise clause. Id. at 1609 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Additionally, Justice O'Connor
reminded the majority that although many free exercise cases have been resolved in favor of
the government interest, the compelling state interest test was applied to afford religious in-
terests the weight they deserve when balanced against state interests. Id. (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) (stating that mere rejection of prior free exercise claims should not call into question
validity of first amendment doctrine). Justice O'Connor criticized the majority because it
overruled established free exercise precedent on the basis of the "win-loss record" of past
claimants, rather than on the substantive standards applied in those cases. Id. at 1610
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
Contrary to the majority's interpretation of recent case law, Justice O'Connor argued that
recent decisions have affirmed that the compelling state interest test is entrenched in first
amendment doctrine. Id. at 1611 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted that
the strict scrutiny test was not applied in Roy and Lyng because those cases did not involve
government coercion or prohibition of conduct, but rather involved the plaintiffs' requests for
the government to structure its policy in a way that was not offensive to their religious beliefs.
Id. at 1611-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Roy and Lyng, therefore, did not reject the compel-
ling state interest test. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1611 (O'Connor,J., concurring). Those cases can
be distinguished from cases involving coercion or prohibition of religious conduct, such as
Smith, Sherbert, or Yoder. Id. at 1611-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice
O'Connor argued that the other cases cited by the majority to support the proposition that
the compelling state interest test should no longer be applied to neutral laws arose in contexts
in which the government has traditionally not been required to justify the burden on a reli-
gious interest. Id. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (applying reasonableness test to prison regulations infringing upon reli-
gious practices); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (upholding Army policy
prohibiting wearing head covering, even as applied to Jewish soldier's wearing of yarmulke).
175. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1610 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
178. See id. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that majority's reasoning for
abandoning compelling interest analysis is faulty).
179. See id. at 1612-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that majority's "parade of hor-
ribles" was inadequate basis for discarding compelling interest test).
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the first amendment requires a fact sensitive, case-by-case determi-
nation of whether the state's interest is compelling and whether
there are less restrictive means available to achieve that interest. I80
This analytical approach is a constitutional norm, not the anomaly
the Court feared. 8 1 Justice O'Connor further argued that accom-
modation of religious practices should not be left to the political
process.18 2 The Bill of Rights was enacted precisely to protect the
free exercise of religion from the "vicissitudes of political
controversy."18 3
After discussing the majority's wrongful abandonment of the
compelling interest test, Justice O'Connor, in Part III of her concur-
ring opinion, reasoned that if the test was applied in Smith to Ore-
gon's criminal prohibition of peyote, Oregon would have satisfied
this test.18 4 She, therefore, concurred in the result but not in the
reasoning reached by the majority that the Constitution does not
require Oregon to exempt the sacramental use of peyote from its
controlled substance laws.18 5 Unlike the majority, however, Justice
O'Connor balanced the state's interest in controlling the use of pe-
yote against the respondents' free exercise interests to reach her
conclusion.18 6 She argued that uniform application of Oregon's
criminal prohibition of peyote use is necessary to accomplish the
state's goals of controlling drug abuse and protecting its citizens
from the harms associated with drug use.18 7
180. Id. at 1611, 1613 (O'Connor,J., concurring) (noting that courts are capable of apply-
ing free exercise precedent and balancing religious liberties against state interests).
181. Id. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that majoritarian rule has had harsh
impact on unpopular or emerging religious groups such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Amish).
183. Id. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
184. Id. at 1615 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 1613 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
186. Id. at 1614 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
187. Id. at 1614-15 (O'Connor,J., concurring). AlthoughJustice O'Connor's concurrence
stressed the importance of safeguarding religious liberty, she has given broad deference to
the state's asserted compelling interest in each free exercise case in which she has partici-
pated. See supra notes 101-20 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's role in
Lyng and Roy). The language of the Smith concurrence suggests a commitment to individual
rights, but it must be noted that the concurring opinion in Smith, like the majority opinion in
the case, would devastate the Native American Church. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606 (conced-
ing that approach adopted in Smith places members of minority religious group at "relative
disadvantage"); id. at 1615 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (voicing agreement with majority that
constitutionality of law infringing upon religion should not turn on centrality of particular
practices to faith). Justice O'Connor's concurrence demonstrates that even under an applica-
tion of the Sherbert balancing test, the Court may rule against individual free exercise interests
by affording little weight to the religious interests and great weight to the competing govern-
mental interest. See Comment, Free Exercise in the 1980s, supra note 24, at 516 (asserting that
weights assigned to each interest in balancing process "is critical to the outcome of the deci-
sion"). If the Court assesses the government's burden of granting an exemption by looking
to the effect of a single exemption, then the individual interest may be meaningfully weighed
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D. The Dissent
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dis-
sented from the Court's judgment.18 8 The dissent agreed withJus-
tice O'Connor's concurring opinion that the Court should have
reviewed Oregon's law proscribing peyote use among Native Ameri-
can Church members under the compelling state interest test. 189
The dissent argued, however, that Oregon did not satisfy this test,
and that the United States Constitution requires the respondents'
religious use of peyote to be exempt from criminal drug laws. 190
Rather than weighing the state's broad interest in controlling
drug abuse against the respondents' free exercise claim, the dissent
argued that past precedent requires a narrow inquiry.191 Thus, the
issue in the case was whether the state's interest in preventing the
religious use of peyote, rather than the state's interest in controlling
drug use generally, outweighed the respondents' free exercise
rights. 19 2
The dissent contended that the state's interest in proscribing pe-
yote use among the Native American Church is weak' 93 and largely
against the governmental interest. Id. On the other hand, if the Court balances the individual
interest against the broad societal interest served by the law or governmental action in ques-
tion, the Court will most likely refuse to protect the individual interest. Id.; see also Smith, 4 10
S. Ct. at 1617 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that state's interest should be interpreted
narrowly to give meaning to free exercise rights); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protec-
tive Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 465-66 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Court cannot
justifiably interpret state interest to define away rights); see also supra notes 37-39 (discussing
Court's application of Sherbert balancing test and various commentators' views regarding
Court's use of balancing test).
None of the justices joined Part III ofJustice O'Connor's concurrence. Five justices agreed
to eliminate the compelling state interest test. See id. at 1602 (writing for majority, justice
Scaliajoined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy, declined
to apply Sherbert balancing test). Three justices believed that the test should be retained and
that Oregon's law did not meet the strict standards of the test. Id. at 1616 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (writing in dissent, justice Blackmun, joined by justices Brennan and Marshall,
maintained that compelling state interest test is applicable and under that test, Oregon's law
does not pass muster). Of the six justices who decided to reject the respondents' claims in
Smith, only justice O'Connor argued that the state's interest in regulating peyote use was
compelling. Id. at 1615 (O'Connor,J., concurring). The majority did not discuss the weight
of the state's specific interest in controlling drug use, but rather found that the state's general
interest in structuring generally applicable laws must be immune from constitutional chal-
lenge. Id. at 1600.
188. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1615 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 1615-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see supra notes 41 & 60 (discussing
commentators who advocate eliminating strict scrutiny as standard of review in free exercise
cases).
190. Id. at 1617-18 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 1617.
192. Id.
193. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing peyote ritual as beneficial,
rather than harmful activity). The dissent noted that the Church confines its peyote use to
specific ceremonial occasions. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1619 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Children
do not partake in the ritual, nor do unwilling members of the Church. Id. at 1619 (Blackmun,
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symbolic.1 94 Only one reported case exists in which Oregon sought
to prosecute an individual for sacramental peyote use. 195 The
state's claim that it has a compelling interest in preventing religious
peyote use cannot seriously withstand strict scrutiny, argued Justice
Blackmun, because Oregon does not enforce the criminal prohibi-
tion of peyote against the Native American Church.' 96 On the other
J., dissenting). Anyone who uses peyote outside the religious context is seriously repri-
manded. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Additionally, noted the dissent, Oregon presented
no evidence to prove that peyote use within the Native American Church is dangerous to its
members. Id. at 1618 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In fact, the social support associated with
membership in the Church and participation in its rituals involving peyote is a positive experi-
ence for the members that promotes brotherly love, care of family, self-reliance, and avoid-
ance of alcohol. Id. at 1619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Brief of Association on
American Indian Affairs, supra note 127, at 33-34 (quoting Native American Church member-
ship card)). Alcoholism, however, has had tragic effects on Native Americans. Id. at 1619
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Evidence suggests a direct correlation between religious peyote
use and abstinence from alcohol. Id. at 1620 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
The dissent also argued that because the frequency of illegal trafficking of peyote is negligi-
ble, exemptions for the Native American Church would not present a law enforcement prob-
lem. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
At first blush, the dissent appears to advocate a usurpation of the role of state legislatures in
its assertion that the state's interest is not sufficiently compelling to withstand strict scrutiny.
Id. at 1620-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The role of the judiciary is not to make legislative
decisions. See generally U.S. CONsT. art. III (vesting adjudicatory, not legislative power in judi-
ciary). Courts, however, do not exceed their authority when they engage in strict scrutiny
evaluations. See supra notes 37-76 and accompanying text (discussing strict scrutiny test as
well-established and widely-accepted method of free exercise judicial review). The role ofthe
Court is to decide whether assigned burdens of persuasion have been met. See supra notes 37-
76 and accompanying text (describing process of applying strict scrutiny to religion cases).
The dissent in Smith merely argued that the Constitution demands a state to satisfy a heavy
burden when a free exercise right is implicated and that, in this case, the state did not meet its
assigned burden. Smith, I10 S. Ct. at 1618 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 1617 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Oregon argued that if it granted an exemption
to the Native American Church, then a flood of other claims for religion-based exemptions
would arise. Id. at 1620 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). The state contended that it would then be
faced with the dilemma of risking violation of the establishment clause in granting exemptions
to some religions but not others. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that this
claim can be made in every free exercise case and that similar claims have been rejected in the
past. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The states' obligation not to favor a particular religion is
satisfied when the compelling state interest test is applied uniformly to all free exercise claims.
Id. at 1620-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also supra note 40 (discussing tension between
establishment clause and free exercise clauses).
195. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1617 n.3 (citing State v. Soto, 21 Ore. App. 794, 537 P.2d 142
(1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976)). Smith involved a refusal to grant unemployment
benefits to employees fired for violating the criminal prohibition of peyote use, rather than a
prosecution for peyote use. Id. at 1597-98.
196. Id. at 1616 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the Court for grant-
ing certiorari on the state's petition and deciding the constitutionality of applying the criminal
prohibition of peyote against the Native American Church. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The dissent noted that Oregon did not criminally enforce the law and that the Unemployment
Board did not rely on the criminal prohibition of peyote when it defended its denial of unem-
ployment benefits to respondents before the state court. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The
dissent stated:
It is surprising, to say the least, that this Court which so often prides itself about
principles ofjudicial restraint and reduction of federal control over matters of state
law would stretch its jurisdiction to the limit in order to reach, in this abstract setting,
the constitutionality of Oregon's criminal prohibition of peyote use.
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hand, explained the dissent, members of the Native American
Church cannot practice their religion without peyote.1 97 Peyote em-
bodies the deity of the Native American Church; eating the plant is
an essential act of worship.198 The dissent concluded that because
of the severe impact that Oregon's criminal prohibition of the use of
peyote will have on the Native American Church and the compara-
tively weak state interest in enforcing the prohibition against the
Church, Oregon's law, as applied to religious use of peyote, violates
the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 199
III. ANALYSIS OF SMITH
In the decade preceding Employment Division v. Smith,200 the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state in the majority of free
exercise cases it considered. 20 ' In a case involving coercion or pro-
hibition of religious practices incidental to a facially neutral law,
however, precedent clearly indicates that the Court should apply the
strict scrutiny test espoused in Sherbert and Yoder.20 2 Although, with
the exception of Yoder, the Court found a sufficiently compelling
state interest in every case not involving unemployment benefits,
before Smith there was at least a pretense that the government was
required to accommodate religious interests whenever possible. 203 .
After Smith, however, governments are not required to consider
and accommodate religious interests when passing secular legisla-
tion. 204 Regardless of the effect upon a particular religion, the gov-
Id.
AsJustice O'Connor's concurring opinion noted, the Court also reached too far in its attack
on the compelling state interest test. Id. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Court,
argued Justice O'Connor, could have reached its desired result under the compelling state
interest test and refrained from changing the course of free exercise doctrine. Id. (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
197. See id. at 1622 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasizing importance of peyote ritual);
see also supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing peyote ritual); Smith, 110 S. Ct. at
1622 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing peyote ritual); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716,
721, 394 P.2d 813, 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 73 (1964) (discussing sacramental use of peyote).
198. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1622 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that, be-
cause of the prohibition against the establishment of religion, the courts should refrain from
questioning whether a particular religious practice is central to a religion. The dissent noted,
however, that the courts must not "turn a blind eye to the severe impact of a State's restric-
tions on the adherents of a minority religion." Id. at 1621 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 1622 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
200. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
201. See supra notes 78-124 and accompanying text (discussing decline of free exercise
protection).
202. See supra notes 37-76 and accompanying text (discussing compelling state interest
test as well-established element of free exercise jurisprudence).
203. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text (discussing cases where Court found
state's interest to satisfy compelling state interest test).
204. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1600 (1990) (explaining rationale for
subjugating free exercise rights to secular, neutral legislation).
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ernment is free to pass any law or engage in any practice that it
deems necessary, as long as its motive is not discriminatory.205 Dur-
ing the decade preceding Smith the vitality of Sherbert's compelling
state interest test was cast into doubt. Now, with the ruling in Smith,
the Supreme Court has "rolled back" protections of individual free
exercise rights. 20 6
The Smith decision is misguided in four respects. First, the Court
refused to apply the strict scrutiny test established in Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, even though it was directly applicable to the facts and issues in
Smith. 20 7 Second, the Court surreptitiously overruled Wisconsin v.
Yoder and subordinated its substance to the result the Smith Court
intended to reach. It maintained that Yoder was inapplicable because
Yoder involved both free exercise and parental autonomy claims.2 08
The Court, however, based its decision in Yoder solely on the free
exercise clause. 209 Third, by removing itself as the protector of reli-
gious liberty, the Court ignored the mandate of free exercise prece-
dent. Viewed together, the free exercise cases spanning the past
fifty years dictate that the Court play an active role in the protection
of religious liberty.21 0 The Court relinquished that role in Smith,
and essentially shirked its responsibility as the mediator between
majority rights and inadequately represented minority rights.
Fourth, the Court's contention that society "court[s] anarchy" when
205. Id. Presumably, the government would not be able to act completely arbitrarily, but
would be required to show that any law or practice is rationally related to a permissible gov-
ernment objective. See supra note 149 (noting that rational basis is inherent in generally appli-
cable laws). Such a test does not offer any realistic first amendment protection because free
exercise cases invariably involve laws with valid purposes that are only offensive to the small
minority of the people affected by the laws. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1608-12 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (rejecting use of rational basis test).
206. Smith is in accord with the recent trend in the courts to reverse the constitutional
safeguards constructed by the Warren Court and, to a lesser degree, by the Burger Court. See,
e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 730 (1989) (striking down affirmative
action program); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3057 (1989) (limit-
ing right to abortion established in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) (holding that scope of constitutional right of privacy does not in-
clude right to practice homosexual sodomy); see also Chemirinsky, The Vanishing Constitution,
103 HARv. L. REV. 43, 44-45 (1989) (stating that Rehnquist Court narrowed important rights
constructed during Warren Court era and that many Rehnquist decisions "will profoundly
affect human lives"); Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-Hose: A Critique of a Negative Rights
Vision of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 412 (1990) (arguing that majority of Rehnquist
Court seeks to "revive" federalism "from the judicial activism of the Warren Court"); Com-
ment, Free Exercise in the 1980s, supra note 24, at 516 (arguing that in area of free exercise,
Court has become increasingly deferential to the government and less protective of individual
rights).
207. See supra notes 37-60 and accompanying text (discussing Sherbert).
208. Employment Div. v. Smith, I10 S. Ct. 1595, 1601 (1990).
209. See supra notes 61-76 and infra notes 223-41 and accompanying text (discussing
Yoder ).
210. See supra notes 21-124 and accompanying text (discussing free exercise cases since
1940).
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the judiciary weighs religious interests against state interests is a
baseless exaggeration.21' Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith is a devastating abridgment of the right
to freely exercise one's religion.
A. The Court Disregarded the Mandate of Sherbert v. Verner
The Supreme Court manipulated well-established free exercise
precedent to reach the result in Smith. Sherbert and its progeny es-
tablished the compelling state interest test as a mechanism to pro-
tect individual free exercise rights.21 2 The Court, however,
contrived distinctions between Smith and Sherbert and held that the
compelling state interest test should not be applied to neutral laws
that incidentally impact the free exercise of religion.213 In effect,
Smith overruled Sherbert and its progeny and endorsed legislative in-
difference to the religious liberty rights of unpopular religions.
The unequivocal message of Sherbert was that whenever a law bur-
dens the free exercise of religion, it must be subjected to strict scru-
tiny.214 Smith acknowledged that the Court has "purported to apply
the Sherbert test" in cases that did not involve unemployment.2 1 5
The Court reasoned, however, that since the strict scrutiny test has
never been applied to invalidate a law outside the unemployment
compensation context, with the exception of Yoder, the test should
not be applied beyond that context.2 16 This reasoning contradicts
the meaning of Sherbert. The Court in Sherbert did not limit the scope
of its holding to the facts of that case. Rather, Sherbert established
the broad principle that the state's interest must always be balanced
against the free exercise rights of the claimant.21 7
The Court in Smith stated that its decision to abrogate the strict
211. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1617-21 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (assessing realistic affect of
granting exemption for religious use of peyote); see also infra notes 254-63 and accompanying
text (rejecting Court's slippery slope argument).
212. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1987)
(applying strict scrutiny test to strike down denial of unemployment benefits to Seventh-day
Adventist terminated for refusing to work on Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,
718 (1981) (applying strict scrutiny test to strike down denial of unemployment benefits to
Jehovah's Witness whose religious beliefs prevented him from manufacturing war weapons);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (finding unconstitutional, as applied to Amish,
mandatory school attendance law conflicting with Amish religious practices and beliefs); Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (holding that free exercise clause requires religious
exemption from unemployment compensation laws); see also supra notes 37-76 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Sherbert and progeny).
213. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1603 (1990).
214. See supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text (discussing Sherbert).
215. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602.
216. Id. at 1602-03.
217. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
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scrutiny test is in "accord with the vast majority" of precedent.218
This statement is erroneous. The only fact in accord with cases that
applied the strict scrutiny test to uphold a law is that the respon-
dents in Smith were unsuccessful in their action.21 9 It is the legal
principle that emerges from a case, however, not the result, that
gives a decision precedential value in subsequent cases. 220 The
principle that emerged from the cases applying the Sherbert test was
that the free exercise of religion is a highly valued constitutional
right that cannot be infringed absent a compelling justification by
the state.22' By abandoning Sherbert, the Court in Smith clearly de-
parted from "the vast majority of precedent." 222
B. The Court Implicitly Overruled Wisconsin v. Yoder
In addition to eviscerating Sherbert, the Court implicitly overruled
Wisconsin v. Yoder.223 The Court stated that even if it were to apply
the compelling state interest test beyond denials of unemployment
compensation, it would never apply the test to a criminal law. 224 As
the law challenged in Yoder was criminal, however, that case cannot
be reconciled with Smith, and must be seen as having been effec-
tively overruled.225
In Smith, the majority claimed that the Supreme Court has never
held that religious beliefs relieve an individual from compliance with
a neutral, generally applicable law. 226 Yoder directly contradicts this
claim. The Court in Yoder stated that "only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legiti-
mate claims to the free exercise of religion." 227 The Court in Smith,
overlooking the explicit message of Yoder, explained that it was not
bound by Yoder because that case was a "hybrid" decision involving
both a free exercise claim and the parental right to direct the educa-
tion of one's children.228
218. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
219. See id (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that "win-loss" record of previous plain-
tiffs does not change "vitality of constitutional doctrine").
220. See 20 AM.JUR. 2D Courts § 183 (1965) (defining stare decisis and stating that "deter-
mination of a point of law by a court will generally be followed by a court of the same or a
lower rank if a subsequent case presents the same legal problem, although different parties
are involved in the subsequent case").
221. See supra notes 37-87 and accompanying text (discussing cases applying Sherbert test).
222. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603 (refusing to apply Sherbert strict scrutiny test to generally
applicable criminal law).
223. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
224. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
225. See supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text (discussing Yoder decision).
226. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
227. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (emphasis added).
228. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601.
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The Court's contention that an explicitly enumerated right in the
Constitution must be accompanied by another right before it gar-
ners first amendment protection is unconvincing. The first amend-
ment states that the right to freely exercise one's religious beliefs
may not be abridged; it does not premise the validity of free exercise
rights upon the existence of another right.
Furthermore, the Court's argument that Yoder was a hybrid deci-
sion is weak. While Yoder's reasoning was partially based on Pierce v.
Society of Sisters,229 which established the right of parents to control
the education of their children,2 0 the Court only invoked Pierce to
show that a state's interest in providing education is not completely
free from the balancing test required when fundamental rights and
interests, such as free exercise or parental rights, are burdened. 23 1
Yoder clearly acknowledged a fundamental right of parents to raise
their children as they wish. It did not suggest, however, that the
free exercise claim asserted by the Amish was inadequate absent this
parental right.23 2 If Yoder was a "hybrid" decision, it is the parental
right that requires an attendant free exercise right in order to be
protected by the Constitution, not vice versa.233 Thus, Smith turned
Yoder on its head by holding that a free exercise right must be com-
bined with another right in order to be reviewed under the compel-
ling state interest test.2 34
An additional reason why characterizing Yoder as a hybrid case
fails is that the Yoder decision clearly and unequivocally determined
that religious liberty, standing alone, deserves first amendment
strict scrutiny. 23 5 A considerable portion of the Yoder decision dis-
cussed the Amish religion and the effect compulsory school attend-
229. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
230. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
231. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232-34 (concluding that state's parens patriae power is not all-
encompassing).
232. M.
233. See id This is evident in the Court's statement in Yoder that Pierce recognized that
"where nothing more than the general interest of the parent in the nurture and education of
his children is involved, it is beyond dispute that the State acts 'reasonably' and constitution-
ally in requiring education to age 16 in some public or private school meeting the standards
prescribed by the State." Id.
234. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1600, 1601 (1990).
Arguably, sacramental peyote use is a "hybrid" right, analogous to those asserted in Pierce
and Yoder, and thus worthy of constitutional protection under the logic of the majority opinion
in Smith. Because peyote use is the foundation of the peyote ceremony, which children attend,
it can be argued that sacramental peyote use involves the rights of parents to educate their
children about their religion and to introduce them to the Native American Church's faith. See
supra note 127 (discussing peyote ritual).
235. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15, 221 (1972) (citing Sherbert rule as
applicable).
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ance has on the religious beliefs of the Amish. 23 6 Throughout the
entire opinion, the Court exalted the value of religious liberty. The
Court stated that where free exercise rights are jeopardized, it could
not accept the claim that a state's interest in its compulsory educa-
tion system is paramount to the established religious practices of the
Amish.23 7 The addition of the parental right, while adding weight to
the free exercise side of the balance, was not necessary to tip the
balance in favor of the Amish.
While both Smith and Sherbert involved the denial of unemploy-
ment benefits, the basis for the denial in Smith, said the Court, was
the violation of a criminal law not a refusal to work, as in Sherbert.238
Thus, the Smith Court found Sherbert inapplicable. Yoder, however,
also involved a criminal prohibition and the Court required Wiscon-
sin to justify its law with a showing of a compelling state interest
served by narrowly tailored means. 239 The Court in Smith, there-
fore, ignored Yoder's mandate that even a generally applicable crimi-
nal law must be subjected to strict scrutiny analysis if it incidentally
burdens an individual's right to freely exercise his or her religion.2 40
Although the Court did not explicitly overrule Yoder, it assigned
the case a new meaning-one which the Court in Yoder did not in-
tend. Now that the Court has supplanted the message of Yoder with
its misguided interpretation, a state may enforce generally applica-
ble laws that criminalize religious conduct, as long as the law does
not impair any rights in addition to the individual's free exercise
rights. Given the recent trend in the Supreme Court toward deny-
ing protection of rights not specifically enumerated in the Constitu-
tion,24 1 it is unlikely that the Court will uphold any "hybrid"
challenges in the future because the Court is unlikely to find another
right upon which to hang free exercise rights.
236. See id. at 25-19 (concluding that negative impact on Amish society would be ines-
capable if Court failed to exempt them from state's compulsory school attendance law).
237. Id. at 221.
238. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1603 (1990).
239. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207 n.2 (providing text of Wisconsin's compulsory school at-
tendance statute).
240. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601 (distinguishing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214
(1972)).
241. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3057-58 (1989) (limiting
right of abortion and thus limiting scope of implied right of privacy); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 195 (1986) (holding that scope of constitutional right of privacy does not include
right to practice homosexual sodomy and stating that Court is "nearest to illegitimacy" when
it expands scope of rights not specifically enumerated in text of Constitution); see also
Gerhardt, supra note 206, at 420-21 & nn.48-49 (arguing that implied fundamental right of
privacy generally, and privacy right to abortion specifically, established during Warren and
Burger Courts, are at "brink of extinction"); Note, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Models
for Illinois?, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 224-25 (discussing Courts' contraction of right to privacy
since mid-1970s).
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C. The Court Ignored the Essence of Past Free Exercise Cases
The Supreme Court erred in Smith by ignoring the essence of past
free exercise decisions. Standing alone, each free exercise case ap-
plying the compelling state interest test contained an element dis-
tinguishable from Smith. Yet, when viewed as a whole, the body of
free exercise case law unequivocally holds that the first amendment
requires courts to strictly scrutinize all laws that have the effect of
inhibiting the free exercise of religion.242
The Court did not apply or interpret precedent to reach its deci-
sion in Smith; rather it dissected each prior free exercise case to
make it appear as if those cases mandated the Smith ruling.243 Free
exercise precedent, however, is greater than the sum of each indi-
vidual case. It is true that Sherbert involved only unemployment
compensation 244 and Yoder involved both a free exercise claim and a
claim of parental rights.245 In addition, it is true that the strict scru-
tiny test, when applied, has often resulted in a decision favoring the
government. 246 It is also true that the Court has not found the first
amendment applicable in cases where a plaintiff seeks to constrain
the government's internal procedures. 247 No free exercise case,
however, has suggested that the Court should remove itself from its
assigned constitutional role as the protector of the Constitution
when the government passes a law insensitive to the free exercise
rights of members of a religious group. The Court in Smith aban-
doned the nation's commitment to protect the right to freely exer-
cise one's religion in favor of an easily applicable, broadly sweeping
rule that is patently unresponsive to the needs of religions whose
interests are not adequately represented in legislatures.
The first amendment protects religious liberty from governmental
restraint that is either intentional or incidental to a neutral law or
practice.248 The respondents in Smith, however, were not afforded
this constitutional protection. The Court's decision to abrogate the
242. See supra notes 37-87 and accompanying text (discussing free exercise precedent ap-
plying strict scrutiny).
243. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1599-1603.
244. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399-400 (1963).
245. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1972).
246. See supra note 20 (citing free exercise cases where Court found law to satisfy strict
scrutiny test).
247. See supra note 18 (citing cases where Court found that free exercise clause does not
encompass right to dictate government procedure).
248. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1987)
(rejecting argument which would end inquiry at initial question of facial neutrality); Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (holding that state's denial of unemployment benefits
was unconstitutional); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (rejecting claim that
state's interest must always take precedence); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)
(renouncing automatic deference to government in this "sensitive constitutional area").
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compelling state interest test and narrow the scope of the free exer-
cise clause to only direct religious discrimination deprived the re-
spondents' of their constitutional right to exercise their religion.249
In addition, to the extent that Oregon makes the practices of the
Native American Church impossible, the decision contravenes this
nation's commitment to the protection and preservation of Native
American culture. 250
D. Application of the Compelling State Interest Test
Will Not Result in Anarchy
The Court in Smith posited a "slippery slope" argument to sup-
port its decision, explaining that our system would be "courting an-
archy" if all laws that burden the free exercise of religion were open
to constitutional challenge. 251 The majority reasoned that the first
amendment does not require courts to balance every free exercise
claim against the importance of government's laws. 252 The Court
stated that it is "horrible to contemplate" federal courts being regu-
larly called upon to balance free exercise claims against state
interests. 253
The Court's argument, however, is unsound because it exagger-
ates t4e frequency with which courts would be asked to invoke the
Sherbert balancing test. Before a court will make the compelling state
interest inquiry, a plaintiff must make a threshold determination
that the asserted religious belief is sincerely held.254 There is no
realistic possibility that courts will be barraged with free exercise
claims and forced to conduct full evidentiary hearings to balance the
competing interests whenever someone is arrested or offended by a
particular law.25 5 If there is no burden on a sincere religious belief
or practice, the claim will be dismissed before a court would have to
apply the Sherbert balancing test.25 6
It is true that judicial determination of the sincerity of a person's
249. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1600, 1603 (1990) (refusing to apply
strict scrutiny test to law severely inhibiting respondents' religion).
250. See supra note 143 (discussing Congress' codification of the nation's commitment to
protect Native Americans in American Indian Religious Freedom Act and discussing federal
exemption of Native American Church from federal law proscribing peyote use and
possession).
251. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1605.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1606 n.5.
254. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing requirement that claimant show
burden upon sincere religious belief).
255. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303-06 (1985)
(rejecting claim for religious exemption from Fair Labor Standards Act, reasoning that, at
minimum, claimants must show burden upon religion).
256. See id. (finding no merit in petitioners' free exercise claims).
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religious beliefs may present an establishment clause problem be-
cause it forces courts to become entangled with religion. The
Supreme Court, however, has determined that obedience to the es-
tablishment clause should not work to preclude protection of the
values inherent in the free exercise clause.25 7 Furthermore, the en-
tanglement resulting from a sincerity determination is minimal.
Free exercise claimants must only demonstrate that they did not
manufacture a religious belief for the purpose of defending the
criminal charge against them.258 This burden may be met with ex-
trinsic evidence regarding the claimants' past conduct, statements,
and demeanor.259 The Court would not be required to delve into
the legitimacy of the religious beliefs; it need only be satisfied that
the claimants sincerely hold their religious beliefs. 260 The claimants
should only be held to a prima facie standard of proving sincerity,
however, in order to prevent the inquiry from becoming an
inquisition.2 61
Because false free exercise claims would be screened out, under
the strict scrutiny test courts would only be called upon to conduct
the test when a sincere religious belief is inhibited by a law or gov-
ernment practice. Even if those remaining religious claims regularly
occupy the courts' time, courts must give these matters their atten-
tion because of the fundamental constitutional rights at stake.262 A
crowded court docket is not sufficient justification for refusing to
protect constitutional rights. 263 By immunizing all neutral laws bur-
257. See supra note 40 (discussing cases employing sincerity requirement despite establish-
ment clause problems and noting that Court has resolved tension between establishment
clause and free exercise clause in favor of free exercise).
258. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring all pleadings to be made in good faith); see also Lupu,
supra note 40, at 954 (suggesting that sincerity requirement is similar to good faith require-
ment in many other areas of law).
259. Lupu, supra note 40, at 954.
260. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714, 716 (1981) (stating that sincerity in-
quiry may only consider whether conduct is based on "honest" religious conviction, but not
on how "acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible" the religious belief appears to
court). But see United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S 78, 92-95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(expressing concern that juries will tend to judge legitimacy of asserted belief rather than
sincerity of religious belief).
261. See Lupu, supra note 40, at 954 (warning that inquiry into sincerity of religious belief
cannot completely escape "distinctly bad aroma of an inquisition"). Professor Lupu argues
that while the sincerity requirement appears to be a good solution to the problem of separat-
ing genuine free exercise claims from manufactured ones, the sincerity requirement has many
weaknesses. Id. Lupu notes that the more eccentric the religious claim, the more likely the
decisionmaker will conclude that "no one could really believe this." Id. Thus, members of
unusual religions who are most susceptible to legislative indifference toward their religious
convictions are the least likely to receive judicial protection from laws proscribing their reli-
gious conduct. Id.
262. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1611 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that Constitution requires case-by-case determination).
263. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (plurality opinion)
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dening freedom of religion from first amendment challenge, the
Supreme Court in Smith endorsed, and indeed encouraged, govern-
mental indifference to first amendment free exercise rights.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SMITH
The Smith decision precludes the success of all future free exercise
challenges to laws, not specifically directed at religious interests,
that incidentally burden religion. For example, a federal or state
criminal law requiring that all circumcisions of male infants be per-
formed by a licensed physician would be upheld under the Smith ra-
tionale if challenged by Jews, whose religious traditions require that
circumcisions be performed by a Rabbi during a religious ceremony
called a bris. If the law applies to all families, and is not motivated
by religious prejudice, regardless of whether there is a compelling
state interest and whether or not an exemption forJews would frus-
trate the state's interest, the law may be upheld under Smith.
Similarly, a law categorically proscribing the consumption of alco-
hol by minors, in any setting, private or public, religious or non-
religious, in the presence of guardians or not, would not withstand a
challenge by the Catholic Church, or any other religion, that regards
the consumption of wine as an integral part of religious ceremonies
involving both minors and adults. A government may, in defense of
such a law, argue that alcohol consumption is dangerous, especially
to minors, and that it would be impossible to enforce such a law if
exemptions were granted. Applying the logic of Smith, the law
would be upheld, regardless of the potentially devastating impact on
religions that place special significance on the sacramental con-
sumption of wine.264 The strict scrutiny test is necessary to ensure
that when legislatures structure their general laws, they do not un-
justifiably inhibit or preclude the practice of religion. 265
It is unlikely, however, that the Smith reasoning would be applied
to uphold laws affecting mainstream religions, such as Judaism and
Catholicism. Because members of these religions are adequately
(ruling that administrative convenience "is not a shibboleth, the mere recitation of which dic-
tates constitutionality"); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (stating that "Constitu-
tion recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency"); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77
(1971) (holding that probate code preferring men over women for appointment as adminis-
trator of decedents' estates violates equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment when
justification for statute is elimination of need for hearing on merits).
264. Religious or sacramental use of wine was exempted from the 1919 federal prohibi-
tion of the right to drink alcohol. See 27 U.S.C. § 16 (1988) (enumerating provisions of Prohi-
bition Act which was made inoperative by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI).
265. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing cases where Supreme Court
invalidated unconstitutional intrusions by legislatures into religious practice).
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represented in this country, legislatures are more sensitive to the
effect that their laws may have on these mainstream religions. 266 If,
in the future, a law burdening the free exercise of a widely practiced
religion were challenged, it is likely that the Court would distinguish
Smith and require the state to grant an exemption to the religious
interest involved. 267
The Court in Smith implicitly diminished the value of the respon-
dents' religion and other religions that are not widely practiced. 268
The Court is unwilling to extend protection to less prevalent reli-
gions and is unwilling to require states to accommodate them.269
Thus, it has embraced, reinforced, and constitutionalized the indif-
ference that a legislature may show toward minority religious
interests. 270
Consequently, the Court created a catch-22 for minority religions.
It stated that mainstream religions do not need judicial protection
because their interests are protected in the legislature,271 while
holding that minority religions are not entitled to the Court's pro-
tection. 272 Those religions that need first amendment protection,
precisely because they are in the minority, will not receive first
amendment protection because the Court has determined that soci-
ety cannot afford the governmental burdens that would result from
providing religious exemptions. 273 The framers of the Constitution
did not explicitly enshrine the free exercise clause in the Bill of
Rights to have it rendered powerless by the judiciary. 274 Neverthe-
266. See Comment, Judicial Scrutiny, supra note 109, at 171 (arguing that institutional ra-
cism causes courts to handle claims by Native Americans differently from claims by members
of "Western-style" religions); see also supra note 264 (noting that sacramental use of wine was
exempted from prohibition of alcohol).
267. See Comment, Judicial Scrutiny, supra note 109, at 171 (arguing that institutional ra-
cism causes courts to handle claims by Native Americans differently from claims by members
of "Western-style" religions); Note, Native American, supra note 109, at 424 (arguing that judi-
ciary is reluctant to treat Judeo-Christian and non-Judeo-Christian religions uniformly). But
see generally Kamenshine, supra note 41, at 153-54 (advocating abandonment of strict scrutiny
in all religion cases involving neutral laws); Marshall; supra note 40, at 386-400 (calling for
elimination of strict scrutiny test in all free exercise cases involving neutral laws).
268. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606 (1990).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. The Court stated that "[i]t may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the
political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not
widely engaged in." Id.
272. See id. at 1603 (finding scope of first amendment does not include neutral laws that
incidentally preclude certain religious practices).
273. Id. at 1605.
274. McConnell, supra note 14, at 1415 (arguing that framers of Constitution viewed ex-
emptions as constitutionally permissible means for protecting religious liberty). But see Reyn-
olds v. United States, 98 U.S. 147, 164-67 (1878) (asserting that framers intended free
exercise clause to apply only to belief in religion, not religious conduct); Comment, The Reli-
gion Clauses and Compelled Religious Divorces: A Study of Marital and Constitutional Separations, 80
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less, the Smith Court has rendered the free exercise clause impotent.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith con-
travenes past free exercise cases and conflicts with this nation's com-
mitment to religious liberty. Prior to Smith, the Court required
governments to justify a neutral law inhibiting the free exercise of
religion by showing that the law uses the least restrictive means to
achieve a compelling state interest. The Court abandoned the com-
pelling state interest test in Smith, thereby eliminating an important
safeguard of religious liberty. The Court's decision effectively al-
lowed Oregon to criminalize the practice of the respondents' reli-
gion. The implications of the decision, however, extend far beyond
the fate of the Native American respondents in Smith. By refusing to
require the government to provide a compelling justification for a
neutral law that makes the practice of religion difficult or impossi-
ble, the United States Supreme Court sends a message to state legis-
latures that they are free to ignore the needs of all minority
religions.
Nw. U.L. REV. 204, 212-13 (1985) (stating that historical evidence suggests that framers of
Constitution may only have intended free exercise clause to protect freedom to believe in
religion, thereby precluding courts' use of strict scrutiny test to protect freedom to act relig-
iously); see also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (stating that historical record of framers' intent regarding religion clauses is am-
biguous, and searching for true intent of framers is "futile and misdirected"); Marshall, Un-
precedented Analysis and Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925, 925 (1986) (arguing that
neither historical understanding or text of Constitution can provide definitive resolution to
free exercise cases).
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